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VULNERABILITY, CANADIAN DISASTER LAW,
AND THE BEAST
JOCELYN STACEY*
This article argues that Canadian law plays a central role in creating and ameliorating
conditions of disaster vulnerability. Using the circumstances surrounding the 2016 Fort
McMurray wildfire for context, the article identifies and assesses the shared, structural
features of Canada’s emergency management laws and their application to “natural”
disasters. This article argues that these laws lag behind foundational social science research
on disasters. It argues that Canadian emergency management laws fail to incorporate a
multi-faceted vulnerability perspective, which leaves communities unnecessarily susceptible
to disaster harm. This article offers some preliminary suggestions on how Canadian disaster
law can begin to integrate a vulnerability perspective to rectify existing gaps and flaws at
all stages of the disaster cycle.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Disasters cause significant harm to life, livelihood, and property.1 Climate change now
amplifies background disaster risk by increasing the chance of climate-related extreme
events. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports that climate change
has already impacted “natural and human systems on all continents and across the oceans.”2
* Assistant Professor, Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia, Vancouver. Many thanks
to my colleagues, Ben Goold and Darlene Johnston, for their helpful feedback on the arguments in this
article; to the two anonymous reviewers who provided very thoughtful and constructive comments; and
to participants in the “Cities, Planning Law & the Public Interest” research panel at the Allard School
of Law, 12 June 2017. All errors remain my own.
1 The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction estimates that, between 2005–2014, disasters
caused 700,000 deaths, $1.4 trillion in damage, and affected 1.7 billion people worldwide: United
Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction,  “The Economic and Human Impact of Disasters in the
Last 10 Years,” online: <https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/disaster-statistics>. Disasters can be
conceptualized in many different ways. The focus of this article, as will become clear, is on events that
were once commonly known as natural disasters (for example, earthquakes, flooding, hurricanes,
wildfire) rather than human conflict emergencies (for example, war, terrorist attacks), epidemics, or
environmental disasters that are the direct result of man-made hazards (for example, a major oil spill).
2 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Summary for Policymakers” in Christopher B Field et al,
eds, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability: Part A: Global and Sectoral
Aspects: Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 1 at 4 [IPCC, “Summary”].
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It notes, with very high confidence, that ecosystems and human systems are increasingly
vulnerable to the impacts of extreme weather: drought, flood, heat waves, and wildfires, for
example.3 Indeed, what is clear is that climate change has altered and will continue to alter
our ecological support systems in serious and potentially irreversible ways.4 As a result,
people around the globe are subject to the omnipresent threat of climate-related disasters. 
As nations go, Canada is comparatively privileged in terms of its affluence, geography,
and civic infrastructure. Our northern geography means that we are buffered from the
extreme heat experienced, for example, in the Middle East and Australia.5 We have an
abundance of fresh water, and ample space to relocate should uninhabitable conditions arise
due to, for example, rising sea levels. We benefit from first-world physical infrastructure in
the vast majority of our cities and towns,6 and stable and democratic governments at all
levels. Even still, we are vulnerable to climate-related disasters as recent floods, extreme
storms, and wildfires demonstrate.7
As we will see in more detail below, Canada takes an “all-hazards approach” to regulating
emergencies, meaning that federal and provincial laws and policies do not distinguish
between “natural” and “human-induced” emergencies.8 Rather, legislation, policy
frameworks, and central planning documents are developed to apply to all potential hazards,
from terrorist attacks to epidemics to flooding. The focus of these laws and policies is on
sudden and serious events that require a prompt and coordinated governmental response to
protect people and the environment.9 
While an all-hazards approach undoubtedly avoids potentially problematic and arbitrary
distinctions between emergencies, one result is that attention in the legal literature has
gravitated toward its implementation with respect to national security crises resulting from
3 Ibid at 6.
4 Ibid at 10, 12–13.
5 See e.g. Jason Samenow, “Two Middle East Locations Hit 129 Degrees, Hottest Ever in Eastern
Hemisphere, Maybe the World,” The Washington Post (22 July 2016), online: <https://www.washington
post.com/news/capital-weather-gang/wp/2016/07/22/two-middle-east-locations-hit-129-degrees-hottest-
ever-in-eastern-hemisphere-maybe-the-world/>; Penny Timms, “Summer Heat Broke 205 Records and
More Extreme Weather is to Come, Climate Council of Australia Reports,” ABC News (7 March 2017),
online: <www.abc.net.au/news/2017-03-08/summer-heat-part-of-ongoing-extreme-weather-climate-
council-says/8332740>.
6 An important caveat to this is the condition of many First Nations communities: see e.g. David R Boyd,
“No Taps, No Toilets: First Nations and the Constitutional Right to Water in Canada” (2011) 57:1
McGill LJ 81.
7 Canada’s Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development has reported that the federal
government spent more on disaster recovery between 2009–2015 than in the previous 39 fiscal years
combined: Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Spring 2016 Reports of the Commissioner of the
Environment and Sustainable Development: Report 2 Mitigating the Impacts of Severe Weather
(Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2016) at exhibit 2.1, online: <www.oag-bvg.gc.
ca/internet/English/parl_cesd_201605_02_e_41381.html>.
8 Ministers Responsible for Emergency Management, An Emergency Management Framework for
Canada, 3rd ed (Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2017) at 3-4 , online: <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/
cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/mrgnc-mngmnt-frmwrk/mrgnc-mngmnt-frmwrk-eng.pdf> [EM Framework]. The
federal Emergency Management Planning Guide 2010–2011 (Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2010),
online: <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/mrgnc-mngmnt-pnnng/mrgnc-mngmnt-pnnng-
eng.pdf > [EMP Guide] defines this approach at 60 as: 
An approach that recognizes that the actions required to mitigate the effects of emergencies are
essentially the same, irrespective of the nature of the event, thereby permitting an optimization of
scarce planning, response and support resources. The intention of all-hazards generic emergency
planning is to employ generic methodologies, modified as necessary by particular circumstances.
9 EM Framework, ibid at 14, 21 (“disaster” is broadly defined by the seriousness of the harm, and
“emergency” is defined by the suddenness and need for government response).
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terrorist threats. Legal literature on national security vastly out scales the nascent attention
to disasters.10 This article begins to address this inattention to disasters and their regulation
by Canadian law. Accordingly, it uses the phrase “disaster law” deliberately to focus in on
the specific application of Canadian emergency laws to events such as hurricanes, flooding,
wildfire, and earthquakes — in other words, the kinds of events that are commonly called
“natural” disasters.
The lack of scholarly attention has left unnoticed major failings in Canadian disaster law
to incorporate basic insights from interdisciplinary research on disasters. This article
highlights two of these failings. It argues that the current framework of Canadian emergency
law lacks nuance in its understanding of vulnerability and fails to identify and address
communities that are especially vulnerable to disaster harm. Second, it argues that the
implementation of emergency law to disasters fails to adequately incorporate legal
mechanisms that can connect disaster law with the underlying drivers of disaster
vulnerability. Without attending to these core failings, Canadian disaster law leaves
Canadians unnecessarily susceptible to disaster harm.
This article is the first step in a major research project on Canadian disaster law. As a first
step, it lays a foundation for this future research by mapping the terrain of the law in Canada
that governs disasters. It identifies the structural features of this complex of legal norms that
are replicated at each level of government. To provide context for this exercise in mapping,
the article focuses on the circumstances surrounding the 2016 Fort McMurray wildfire. As
we will see, the Fort McMurray wildfire (the Beast) was a dramatic and extreme event,
resulting in the largest prolonged evacuation in Canadian history and requiring a coordinated
and sustained emergency response from all levels of government.11 As extreme events are
predicted to increase in severity and frequency,12 a close examination of this wildfire event
provides particularly useful insight into the implementation of disaster law at multiple scales. 
Focusing on the Beast also allows for a critical examination of the ways in which
Canadian disaster law fails to reflect foundational social science research on disaster harm.
Notably, the critical dimension of the article is largely focused on identifying what is not
included in Canadian disaster law. Namely, it does not incorporate a vulnerability
perspective, which has come to be a dominant perspective in interdisciplinary disaster
research. This article offers some preliminary suggestions on how Canadian disaster law
could integrate basic insights on disaster vulnerability to rectify these gaps. In particular, the
article highlights the need for Canadian disaster law to contain — at the very least — a
framework that identifies communities that we know are especially vulnerable to disaster
harm and provides guidance to decision-makers on how to attend to their vulnerability at all
10 As a very rough estimate of this, a search on WestLaw Next Canada turns up 156 articles on “national
security” whereas a search for “natural disaster” returns only two relevant articles. A search of the Hein
Online Law Journal Library for “national security” returns 93,609 hits; in contrast, “natural disaster”
returns only 7,125. Hurricane Katrina is credited with starting the field of disaster law in the United
States: Daniel A Farber et al, eds, Disaster Law and Policy, 3rd ed (New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2015)
at xxi.
11 It was deemed the news story of the year by the Canadian press: Lauren Krugel, “Fort McMurray
Wildfire Named Canadian Press News Story of 2016,” CBC News (20 December 2016), online:
<www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/fort-mcmurray-wildfire-named-canadian-press-news-story-of-
2016-1.3905042>.
12 IPCC, “Summary,” supra note 2 at 12.
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 stages of disaster management. It also notes the need for concrete legal tools that
explicitly bridge disaster law with other areas of law, such as environmental and land-use
planning laws, in order to reduce community vulnerability to future disaster harm.
Part II of this article dispels any doubts about law playing a meaningful role in governing
disasters. After introducing the events surrounding the Beast, it offers two hypotheses for the
lack of scholarly attention in the legal literature to disaster law. It first addresses the
misconception of disasters as “natural” phenomena rather than the products of social
conditions that make communities vulnerable to disaster. Second, this part analyzes the deep-
seated assumption in legal and political theory that law has a limited — or no — role to play
during times of emergency. Contrary to these two assumptions, Part II establishes that law
is deeply implicated in creating and ameliorating vulnerability to disasters.
Using the Fort McMurray wildfire for context, Part III provides a map of Canadian
disaster law, that is, the application of Canada’s all-hazards emergency law to the specific
subset of emergencies that this article delineates as disasters. Part III outlines the ongoing
regulative role that law plays at each stage of disaster preparedness, response, recovery, and
prevention. As we will see, certain key legal features are mirrored at each jurisdictional level,
creating a thickly-layered body of disaster law. 
While Part III evidences the extensive role that law plays in regulating disasters, it also
highlights serious gaps in this corpus of law and misalignments between its legal and
regulatory requirements and emerging themes on disaster vulnerability from social science
research. This part identifies the ways in which Canadian disaster law can begin to integrate
a vulnerability perspective to rectify existing gaps and flaws. In particular, it argues that
Canadian disaster law requires detailed guidance to decision-makers on how to identify
vulnerable communities and how to attend to their specific vulnerabilities to disaster. It
points to the glaring inadequacy of the federal government’s current approach to emergency
management on First Nations’ reserves as evidence of this urgent need. It also argues that
Canadian disaster law ought to formalize requirements to conduct external post-disaster
assessments and integrate disaster risk analysis into existing planning law. It offers these as
two examples of preliminary reforms that can link disaster law to underlying drivers of
disaster risk. Ultimately, this article shows that we ought to treat the Fort McMurray wildfire
as a clear warning. The outcome of the Beast is a best-case scenario in light of Canadian
disaster law’s current inattention to our ever-present vulnerability to disaster harm. 
II.  DEMYSTIFYING DISASTER LAW 
This part demystifies disaster law. It addresses possible rationales for the belated study
of the law of disasters in Canada — the assumption that disasters are natural and
uncontrollable events and the assumption that law plays little or no role in governing
emergencies — and it allays any lingering concerns that these pose any real barriers to a
critical legal analysis of Canadian disaster law. By the end of this part there should be no
doubt that law is deeply implicated in governing disasters. First, however, this part
introduces the circumstances of the 2016 Fort McMurray wildfire as this provides essential
context for the balance of the article. 
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A. “THE BEAST”
Fort McMurray is an isolated, northern Alberta community, situated in the middle of the
sprawling Canadian boreal forest and at the heart of the Alberta oil sands industry. It has a
permanent population of approximately 80,000 people.13 As the Alberta oil sands industry
boomed, so did Fort McMurray’s population. Between 2000–2015, the population of the
region grew from 51,000 to over 125,000.14 During the same period, the “shadow
population” of temporary residents ballooned by 580 percent.15 Fort McMurray is the main
hub in the Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo, which includes a number of smaller
towns, five First Nations communities, and six Métis Locals.16
In May of 2016, Fort McMurray and the surrounding region were hit by a devastating
wildfire. The fire burned over 5,000 km2,17 an area almost equivalent to that of Prince
Edward Island. It resulted in the largest prolonged evacuation in Canadian history,18 with
88,000 evacuees out of the region’s 125,000 residents.19 Video footage of the wildfire and
the evacuation was gripping. It showed long lines of hundreds of vehicles crawling along a
highway flanked by flames while sparks rained down upon the vehicles’ rooftops. The fire
precipitated an unprecedented amount of private donations to the Canadian Red Cross.20
Remarkably, only two people were killed during the wildfire — in a vehicle accident during
the evacuation.21 And, despite the wildfire ripping right through the city, only 2,400 homes
and buildings — or 15 percent of the city’s buildings — were destroyed.22
The wildfire first triggered a state of local emergency, declared on 1 May 2016.23 On
3 May 2016, the fire expanded and rapidly and unexpectedly changed its course. While the
municipality had forewarned residents to prepare to evacuate, backyards were on fire before
mandatory evacuation orders were issued.24 Within a span of a mere four hours, the majority
of residents were ordered to leave. By the night of 3 May 2016, the entire city was under a
mandatory evacuation order25 and the Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation had also declared
a state of local emergency.26 The result — the only way to manage such an extensive and
urgent evacuation without causing gridlock — was to divide the city in half.27 The south of
13 Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo, The Municipal Census 2015 Report (RMWB, 2015) at 9,
online: <https://www.rmwb.ca/Assets/Corporate/Census+Reports/Municipal+Census+2015+Report.
pdf>.
14 Ibid at 13.
15 Ibid at 15, 66.
16 Ibid at 81.
17 Government of Alberta, Home Again: Recovery after the Wood Buffalo Wildfire (Edmonton:
Government of Alberta, 2016) at 4, online: <https://www.alberta.ca/documents/Wildfire-Home-Again-
Report.pdf> [Government of Alberta, Home Again].
18 Ibid at 6.
19 Ibid at 4. 
20 Ibid at 11.
21 Ibid at 6.
22 Ibid at 4; KPMG LLP, May 2016 Wood Buffalo Wildfire: Post-Incident Assessment Report (Edmonton:
Alberta Emergency Management Agency, 2017) at 14, online: <https://www.alberta.ca/assets/
documents/Wildfire-KPMG-Report.pdf> (reports that 1,958 structures were destroyed).
23 Issued at 10:33 p.m. through Alberta Emergency Alert, “Information Alert Update – Wildfire,” online:
<www.emergencyalert.alberta.ca/alerts/2016/05/3699.html> [“Wildfire”].
24 Marion Warnica, “Battling the Beast: The Untold Story of the Fight to Save Fort McMurray,” CBC
News (27 July 2016), online: <www.cbc.ca/interactives/longform/news/battling-the-beast-fort-
mcmurray-wildfire>.
25 “Wildfire,” supra note 23 at May 3rd 6:49 p.m. and 11:47 p.m.
26 KPMG LLP, supra note 22 at 26.
27 Warnica, supra note 24.
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the city evacuated down the only highway to the south, toward Edmonton and Calgary. The
northern part of the city had to travel north on the same highway away from any major
centres or resources, deeper into the boreal forest. The gamble, fortunately, paid off. Despite
the fire moving to the north, northern residents and evacuees remained safe.28 On 4 May
2016, the province declared a state of emergency and took the lead over the disaster
response.29 The provincial state of emergency remained in effect for two months, during
which the province’s resources were supplemented with those of the Canadian military,
Ontario, and South African firefighting personnel.30 After extensive (and ongoing) recovery
efforts, the majority of residents were able to move back to the city by mid-summer.31
B. CONTEXTUALIZING THE “WILD” IN WILDFIRE 
The Beast is a quintessential example of a natural disaster: a fire of extreme proportions
that acted in unpredictable ways that experts did not think were possible. For example, it
jumped the Athabasca River, a distance of over one kilometre and four times the width of a
man-made firebreak.32 Tellingly named the Beast, the fire’s dynamics were the product of
a confluence of environmental factors, such as the unusually high spring temperatures and
strong winds blowing the fire toward Fort McMurray.33 While experts believe that the
immediate trigger of the Beast was human caused,34 wildfire is an event that can — and
frequently does — occur in the absence of any human influence.
For centuries, events such as wildfires were conceptualized primarily as natural events.
Beginning in the Enlightenment era, commentators analyzed the wild and unpredictable
behaviour of disasters.35 No longer understood as divine intervention (at least not solely),
disasters became objects of scientific scrutiny capable of being observed and studied.
Scientific fields of seismology and meteorology developed as means to better understand
these natural phenomena and mitigate their potential harms.36 The study of natural disasters
led to the production of sufficient knowledge to develop coordinated response and mitigation
efforts.37
Scientific analysis of disasters continues to be a vital part of disaster research. But
disasters are no longer understood primarily in scientific terms. Across disciplines, the
28 Ibid.
29 OIC 107/2016 (Emergency Management Act).
30 Government of Alberta, Home Again, supra note 17 at 8.
31 Ibid at 16.
32 Warnica, supra note 24.
33 Paul Roundy, “Why the Effects of 2016 El Niño Trumped Climate Change in the Alberta Wildfires,”
The Conversation (17 May 2016), online: <https://www.theconversation.com/why-the-effects-of-2016-
el-nino-trumped-climate-change-in-the-alberta-wildfires-59201>.
34 Justin Giovannetti, “Fort McMurray Wildfire ‘Most Likely Human Caused,’ Alberta Senior Wildfire
Manager Says,” The Globe and Mail (4 June 2016), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/
news/national/fort-mcmurray-wildfire-most-likely-human-caused-alberta-senior-wildfire-manager-
says/article30279836/>.
35 On the shifting paradigms of disasters from acts of God to acts of nature to acts of man: see Kristian
Cedervall Lauta, Disaster Law (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2015) at 14ff. See also EL Quarantelli, ed,
What is a Disaster?: A Dozen Perspectives on the Question (London: Routledge, 1998); Ronald W
Perry, “What is a Disaster?” in Havid́́án Rodríguez, Enrico L Quarantelli & Russell R Dynes, eds,
Handbook of Disaster Research (New York: Springer, 2007) 1.
36 Lauta, ibid at 19.
37 Ibid.
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predominant conception of disasters is as social phenomena.38 That is, while the trigger or
hazard may be of natural origin (a wildfire or earthquake), what makes the event a disaster
is the community’s inability to cope with the event.39 A wildfire in the middle of the boreal
forest may not be a disaster. But a wildfire in the boreal forest bearing down on a remote city
of 80,000 people with only one highway out of town has all the makings of a disaster.
One of the most vivid depictions of a “natural” disaster in many North Americans’ minds
remains Hurricane Katrina, a devastating category five hurricane that destroyed much of
New Orleans in 2006. Yet, despite a hurricane being a classic example of a “natural”
disaster, commentators have extensively documented the direct effect that social conditions
had on the harm suffered as a result of the hurricane. Incautious planning and maintenance
of the levees, combined with a slow and confused emergency response, disproportionately
affected poor, African-American residents of New Orleans.40 Moreover, human caused
indirect environmental effects massively increased residents’ vulnerability to major storms.
The failed levees, for example, built to offer flood protection to the city of New Orleans, also
degraded the wetlands along the Gulf by preventing the deposition of sediment from the
Mississippi River.41 Without this sediment, the wetlands lining the coast collapsed, depriving
the coastline of the crucial storm surge protection provided by wetlands’ absorptive capacity.
A similar, complex dynamic was at work in the Fort McMurray wildfire disaster with a
number of direct and indirect human actions conspiring to increase the likelihood and
severity of this extreme event. In particular, the unseasonably high spring temperatures and
the lack of precipitation in the preceding 12 months are expected consequences of human
caused climate change, exacerbated in 2016 by the effect of El Niño.42 Writing about the
Lisbon earthquake over 300 years ago, Jean-Jacques Rousseau famously penned: “it was
hardly nature that there brought together twenty-thousand houses of six or seven stories.”43
Indeed, the same can be said for Fort McMurray: it was hardly nature that built one of
Alberta’s major urban centres in the middle of the vast boreal forest.44 
Perhaps lingering notions about disasters being natural phenomena has impeded scholarly
legal analysis. When conceptualized as natural phenomena, as events largely outside human
control, there is little role for law to play in governing disasters. As natural phenomena,
disasters present challenges for science and lend themselves, perhaps, to technological
solutions. But, on this view, they cannot be subject to law in any meaningful way. 
38 See Kathleen Tierney, The Social Roots of Risk: Producing Disasters, Promoting Resilience (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2014); Rasmus Dahlberg, Olivier Rubin & Morten Thanning Vendelø, eds,
Disaster Research: Multidisciplinary and International Perspectives (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2016);
Michael K Lindell, “Disaster Studies” (2013) 61:5 & 6 Current Sociology Rev 797.
39 Lauta, supra note 35 at 24. See also Terry Cannon, “Vulnerability Analysis and the Explanation of
‘Natural’ Disasters” in Ann Varley, ed, Disasters, Development and Environment (Chichester: John
Wiley & Sons, 1994) 13 at 14; Farber et al, supra note 10 at 4.
40 Robert RM Verchick, Facing Catastrophe: Environmental Action for a Post-Katrina World (Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010) at 130, 136–37 [Verchick, Facing Catastrophe].
41 Daniel Farber, “Symposium Introduction: Navigating the Intersection of Environmental Law and
Disaster Law” [2011] 6 BYUL Rev 1783 at 1799–800.
42 IPCC, “Summary,” supra note 2 at 6; Roundy, supra note 33.
43 Cited in Lauta, supra note 35 at 20.
44 The wider socio-economic context of the Fort McMurray wildfire came to the fore in the heated
discussion about the fire’s link to climate change and the link between climate change and the oil sands
community: see e.g. Martin Lukacs, “The Arsonists of Fort McMurray Have a Name,” The Guardian
(12 May 2016), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/true-north/2016/may/12/the-
arsonists-of-fort-mcmurray-have-a-name>. 
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Conceptualized as sociological phenomena, however, disasters properly become the
subject of law. As leading disaster geographer Terry Cannon writes, “in general, disasters
are not natural: they happen to people who are put at risk as a result of their vulnerability.”45
Indeed, this concept of vulnerability is a key concept in interdisciplinary disaster research.46
The concept of vulnerability — the susceptibility of individuals, groups, and communities
to disaster harm — is particularly useful for a context-sensitive legal analysis of disasters.
As I explain now, this is because it has universal, individual, and relational dimensions. 
The first conceptual strength of vulnerability is its universality. As human beings, we are
all vulnerable, in some way, to harm.47 Vulnerability “aris[es] from our embodiment, which
carries with it the ever-present possibility of harm, injury, and misfortune.”48 Climate change
amplifies this background condition of vulnerability because we are all universally and
inescapably subject to the effects of a changing climate, including the possibility of a
climate-related disaster. 
At the same time, the concept of vulnerability accommodates individual experience. Its
sensitivity to individual difference is vulnerability’s second conceptual strength. Decades of
international experience with disaster harm reduction emphasizes a focus on people rather
than generic hazards. The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
emphasizes the need for “a broader and a more people-centred preventive approach to
disaster risk.”49 This is because individuals, groups, and communities are vulnerable in vastly
different ways.50 Empirical research documents the extent to which individual characteristics
such as race, gender, ability, and socio-economic status affect vulnerability to disasters.51
Even within a relatively affluent and well-equipped community, such as Fort McMurray,
individuals are differently vulnerable to a major disaster. While all of Fort McMurray was
vulnerable to the Beast, a financially-secure family with extended family in Edmonton was
vulnerable in a very different way than a single-income, socially-isolated family facing post-
disaster job loss. And these experiences of vulnerability are very different still from an
Indigenous member of the community who lost traplines, ceremonial objects, and the
temporary ability to hunt and trap in traditional territory. Importantly, social science research
45 Supra note 39 at 19 [emphasis in original].
46 See e.g. W Neil Adger, “Vulnerability” (2006) 16 Global Environmental Change 268; Farber et al, supra
note 10, ch 5; Verchick, Facing Catastrophe, supra note 40. Note that in recent years, disaster research
has shifted from the concept of vulnerability to its positive foil, resilience: see e.g. Adger,
“Vulnerability,” ibid; Tierney, supra note 38. As we will see, Canadian disaster law has yet to grapple
with vulnerability in any tangible way. Therefore, the focus of this article is necessarily on vulnerability
and how law can and ought to incorporate its insights before it can progress from diagnosing the
problem (vulnerability) to identifying solutions (resilience). 
47 Although the focus of this article is on human vulnerability to disaster harm, note that vulnerability can
and is extended to non-human life, including species (for example, the International Union for
Conservation of Nature Red List of Threatened Species contains a category for “vulnerable” species:
International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, “Red List of Threatened
Species,” online: <www.iucnredlist.org>).
48 Martha Fineman concisely sets out the case for vulnerability as an animating concept in equality law:
Martha Albertson Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition”
(2008) 20:1 Yale JL & Feminism 1 at 9.
49 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction
2015–2030 (Geneva: UNODRR, 2015), art 7 [UNISDR, Sendai].
50 Ibid at 9–10; Lindell, supra note 38 at 799.
51 Susan L Cutter, Bryan J Boruff & W Lynn Shirley, “Social Vulnerability to Environmental Hazards”
(2003) 84:2 Social Science Q 242; Farber et al, supra note 10 at 281.
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on disasters demonstrates that individuals and groups who are marginalized or disadvantaged
during ordinary times are those who are most vulnerable to disasters.52 
Third, vulnerability is relational in the sense that it positions individuals within webs of
social and ecological relationships. The UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
defines vulnerability as “[t]he conditions determined by physical, social, economic, and
environmental factors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of a community to the
impact of hazards.”53 The IPCC adds that vulnerability to climate-related events is the result
of multifaceted, non-climatic factors.54 It writes that “heightened vulnerability is … the
product of intersecting social processes that result in inequalities in socioeconomic status and
income, as well as in exposure [to adverse effects].”55 Disaster vulnerability — the
intertwining of ecological and social factors — is the vulnerability of place.56
The Fort McMurray wildfire illustrates how interconnecting physical and environmental
exposure to disasters creates vulnerability. A crown fire, like the Fort McMurray wildfire,
will likely cause much greater damage than a surface fire. But social and economic factors
also impact vulnerability. A well-coordinated municipal alert system and the ability to access
a vehicle, for example, reduce one’s vulnerability to disaster. 
As a relational concept, vulnerability provides a means by which to analyze the ways in
which physical and social interconnections confer advantage and disadvantage that create
conditions of vulnerability.57 Indeed, disaster research notes that many of the systemic drivers
of disaster vulnerability are the same drivers of inequality generally (for example, race and
poverty).58 Institutional practices such as the provision of universal health care or basic social
services and housing, or mandatory environmental assessment that looks for disaster risks
before development, all contribute to an individual or group’s vulnerability.59 Because the
state is constituted through these sets of institutional practices and is thus deeply implicated
in the conferral of advantages (for example, access to universal health care) and
disadvantages (for example, inadequate secure housing), the state bears a responsibility to
52 See especially Ben Wisner et al, eds, At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability and Disasters,
2nd ed (London: Routledge, 2004) at 4.
53 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015: Building
the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters: Extract from the Final Report of the World
Conference on Disaster Reduction (Geneva: UNISDR, 2007) at 1, n 1 [UNISDR, Hyogo]; UNISDR,
Sendai, supra note 49 at 10, n 4. In contrast to Canada’s all-hazards approach, the UN Strategy for
Disaster Reduction addresses “hazards of natural origin and related environmental and technological
hazards and risks” (UNISDR, Hyogo, ibid at 1, n 3).
54 IPCC, “Summary,” supra note 2 at 6. See also Adger, “Vulnerability,” supra note 46; W Neil Adger,
“Social and Ecological Resilience: Are They Related?” (2000) 24:3 Progress in Human Geography 347.
55 IPCC, “Summary,” ibid.
56 Susan Cutter, “The Geography of Social Vulnerability: Race, Class, and Catastrophe” in Understanding
Katrina: Perspectives from the Social Sciences (11 June 2006), online: <understandingkatrina.
ssrc.org/Cutter/> [Cutter, “Geography”]; Cannon, supra note 39 at 14–15; Robert RM Verchick,
“Disaster Justice: The Geography of Human Capability” (2012) 23:1 Duke Envtl L & Pol’y F 23 at 39
[Verchick, “Disaster Justice”].
57 Fineman, supra note 48 at 16. See also Tierney, supra note 38; Amartya Sen, Resources, Values and
Development (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1984).
58 Wisner et al, supra note 52 at 8–10; Cutter, Boruff & Shirley, supra note 51; Verchick, “Disaster
Justice,” supra note 56 at 23; Adger, “Vulnerability,” supra note 46 at 273. This accords with
international experience as well: see UNISDR, Sendai, supra note 49, art 6.
59 Cutter, “Geography,” supra note 56.
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address vulnerability.60 Vulnerability requires a responsive and responsible state. Nowhere
is this expectation clearer than in the aftermath of a disaster.61
To sum up, the concept of vulnerability in disaster research is analytically useful because
it captures the universal, individual, and relational aspects of disaster harm and response.
These features of vulnerability make plain a crucial implication for law: law has an essential
role to play in regulating disasters. In a democracy governed under the rule of law, law
legitimates the exercise of public authority. Law not only structures, but also legitimates, the
institutional practices that create conditions of vulnerability.
C. DISASTER AS EXCEPTION
The misconception of disasters as solely natural phenomena dovetails with a deep-seated
assumption in legal and political theory that emergencies are not governable by law.62 For
example, in his Two Treatises on Government, John Locke theorizes that in ordinary times,
government functions are carried out under the rule of law, but that the Crown retains a
reserve of prerogative power “to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the
prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it.”63 Emergencies are one scenario
Locke foresees in which the legislature will not be able to act, and thus the prerogative —
or the exercise of executive discretion — will be necessary to respond appropriately.64 
Emergencies continue to be a perennial focus of political and legal scholarship. Scholarly
attention to the state of emergency has surged in the post-9/11 era with an initial focus on the
constitutional implications of the “war on terror”65 and evolving to focus on the permeation
of preventive legal measures in the anti-terrorism context.66 Much of this conversation about
states of emergency has centred on the underlying assumption that law plays little to no role
in times of crisis. One constitutional scholar helpfully characterizes the law’s role as a toggle
switch that flips back and forth between normalcy — governed by ordinary laws and legal
requirements — and emergency — governed by a separate legal regime.67 Canada’s now-
60 Fineman, supra note 48 at 8–9. Fineman’s argument about state responsibility finds further support in
theories of republicanism which argue that the state has an obligation to protect individuals from
domination: see Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997); Evan Fox-Decent, Sovereignty’s Promise: The State as Fiduciary, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012).
61 Verchick, Facing Catastrophe, supra note 40 at 146.
62 This connection is made in a slightly different way in my earlier work on the theoretical framework of
the environmental emergency: Jocelyn Stacey, “The Environmental Emergency and the Legality of
Discretion in Environmental Law” (2015) 52:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 985. See also Lauta, supra note 35 at
ch 3.
63 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (London: Printed for R Butler, 1821) at para 160.
64 Ibid. See also more controversially Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of
Sovereignty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985) at 5–7.
65 For a summary, see Thomas Poole, “Constitutional Exceptionalism and the Common Law” (2009) 7:2
Intl J Constitutional L 247. See also Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2005); Bruce Ackerman, Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age
of Terrorism (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 2007); Oren Gross, “Chaos and Rules: Should
Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?” (2003) 112:5 Yale LJ 1011; David Dyzenhaus,
The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University
Press, 2006).
66 See especially Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, Preventive Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2014).
67 Kim Lane Scheppele, “Small Emergencies” (2006) 40:3 Ga L Rev 835 at 838. See also Oren Gross &
Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice (Cambridge,
Mass: Cambridge University Press, 2006) ch 1 (on models of accommodation).
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repealed War Measures Act is a good example of the toggle switch in operation. The War
Measures Act permitted the executive to declare the existence of an emergency and to take
whatever measures were necessary to maintain security, peace, and welfare in Canada.68 
On this view, law plays a role in governing the emergency, but its focus is narrowly on
the trigger for the emergency and its immediate aftermath. The central preoccupation of legal
scholars writing about this phenomenon is how law can operate as a constraint on the
emergency regime to ensure a polity returns to its normal constitutional order once the
emergency has passed.69 Perhaps because disasters have not posed a similar threat to
destabilizing constitutional order in the common law world, they have not featured in this
literature. 
To the extent that legal scholarship has moved away from the toggle switch to focus on
the increasing juridification of emergency powers, its primary focus has been on the exercise
of state power to infringe civil liberties.70 With the exception of Hurricane Katrina, disasters
and their emergency responses — at least in common law systems — have not posed a
significant threat to civil liberties and have not factored into the broader academic
conversations about preventive justice.71 
As a result, the perception of disasters that arises from the existing legal literature is that
disasters pose no more than a temporary and exceptional disturbance to the ordinary
operation of law. This again may reinforce a misconception that law plays no significant role
in regulating disasters.
As we have seen, the concept of disaster vulnerability goes a long way in dispelling this
misconception. But it is also important to observe that disasters are not conceived of as
temporary and exceptional events in the social science literature on disasters. Rather, they
are conceptualized in terms of a “disaster cycle” (or “disaster management cycle” or “risk
management cycle”). The disaster cycle captures the idea that the disruption caused by a
disaster is only one stage of a continuous, four-stage social and institutional response to any
particular extreme event. The disaster cycle’s four stages are preparedness, response,
recovery, and prevention and mitigation.
Robert Olshansky and Stephanie Chang concisely define these stages in the following
way:
Preparedness involves building the capability to respond quickly when a disaster occurs or is imminent.
Response consists of the actions taken at the time of the disaster to save lives and minimise damage. Recovery
involves the short-term restoration of lifeline systems and long-term restoration of the community to normal
functions. Mitigation consists of activities designed to reduce vulnerability, so as to minimise the deleterious
effects of future disasters.72
68 War Measures Act, RSC 1970, c W-2, as repealed by Emergencies Act, RSC 1985, c 22 (4th Supp), s 80.
69 Gross & Aoláin, supra note 67; Ackerman, supra note 65; Dyzenhaus, supra note 65.
70  Ashworth & Zedner, supra note 66 at 1.
71 Jocelyn Stacey, “Preventive Justice, the Precautionary Principle and the Rule of Law” in Tulich et al,
eds, Regulating Preventive Justice: Principle, Policy and Paradox (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2017)
23 at 23.
72 Robert Olshansky & Stephanie Chang, “Planning for Disaster Recovery: Emerging Research Needs and
Challenges” (2009) 72:4 Progress in Planning 200 at 200 [emphasis in original].
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This concept of the disaster cycle dovetails with the focus on vulnerability. Vulnerability
and the disaster cycle both presuppose the social paradigm of disasters. The disaster cycle
is focused on the community’s ability or inability to respond, rather than on the hazard itself.
Its four stages reflect the fact that conditions of vulnerability are created and ameliorated
long before and can remain long after an extreme event occurs. The disaster cycle responds
to this ever-present possibility of harm through a set of continuous social and institutional
practices that identify, assess, and ameliorate the risk of disaster harm.
This part has addressed potential concerns that law does not — or cannot — play a
meaningful role in regulating disasters. Drawing on mainstream thinking in multidisciplinary
disaster research, it has argued that disasters are not solely natural phenomena, but rather
sociological phenomena that are usefully understood from the perspective of vulnerability.
Vulnerability captures both the environmental and social factors that expose communities
to disaster risk. Because disasters ought to be understood through this lens of vulnerability,
it becomes clear that the role law plays is an ongoing one, and not a toggle switch that
focuses on the extreme event and its immediate aftermath. As we will now see, law also
mediates the disaster cycle — or the varied but continuous set of institutional practices that
seek to reduce the risk of communities to disaster harm.
III.  THE CYCLE OF CANADIAN DISASTER LAW
Having now demonstrated how law plays a significant role in governing disasters, this part
turns to the body of law in Canada that can be considered “disaster law.” In Canada,
constitutional jurisdiction to address disasters falls primarily to the provinces,73 which have
delegated authority over local emergencies to local governments. As a result, this article does
not endeavour to give a comprehensive survey of disaster law across the country.74 Rather,
it focuses on identifying common structural features of disaster law at each level of
government with respect to the Fort McMurray wildfire. We will see that the approach of the
federal, provincial, and municipal government has been to adopt a nested structure in which
the key legal features of each stage of the disaster law cycle are mirrored at each level of
jurisdictional authority. As the scale of the disaster increases, these legal features are engaged
at successively higher levels of government. 
Canadian law and policy explicitly adopts the four-stage cyclical approach to regulating
disasters identified above. However, it uses slightly different nomenclature. The federal
government, provinces, and territories have all agreed to an Emergency Management
Framework,75 which sets out — at a high-level — some common ground for emergency
management practices in Canada. The EM Framework draws a distinction between “disaster”
and “emergency.” It defines disaster as “a social phenomenon that results when a hazard
intersects with a vulnerable community in a way that exceeds or overwhelms the
community’s ability to cope and may cause serious harm to the safety, health, welfare,
property or environment of people.”76 It defines an emergency as “[a] present or imminent
73 Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, ss 92(8), (13), (16), reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix
II, No 5.
74 For a summary of provincial emergency legislation, see Craig Forcese, National Security Law:
Canadian Practice in International Perspective (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) at 360.
75 Supra note 8.
76 Ibid at 21.
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event that requires prompt coordination of actions concerning persons or property to protect
the health, safety or welfare of people, or to limit damage to property or the environment.”77
Relatedly, it uses the language of “emergency management cycle” to describe the ongoing
and iterative set of institutional practices for regulating disasters.78 In spite of this legislated
terminology, this article maintains that “disaster cycle” is the more appropriate phrase
because it reflects the ongoing (that is, not temporary and exceptional) nature of vulnerability
emphasized by disaster researchers. 
In addition to detailing the legal terrain at each stage in the disaster cycle, this part also
argues that Canadian disaster law fails to incorporate a vulnerability perspective. Its failure
is apparent in two principal ways: first, Canadian disaster law focuses on generalized hazards
rather than attending to vulnerable communities; and second, it adopts an unduly narrow
view of the disaster management cycle which fails to link disaster management with systemic
drivers of disaster vulnerability. Accordingly, what is absent is equally as important as what
is identified in the following description of Canadian disaster law.
A. THE LAW OF DISASTER PREPAREDNESS
At each level of government, preparedness is characterized by four central legal features:
(1) emergency management legislation, which constitutes (2) an emergency management
department; (3) a legally required emergency management plan, which is supported in
practice by (4) a government operations centre. While the necessity of comprehensive
preparedness to disaster management is clear from these existing legal features, we will see
that the law of disaster preparedness focuses on hazards, not people or communities. It thus
fails to account for the particular ways in which particular individuals and communities are
vulnerable to disaster harm.
1. FEATURES OF DISASTER PREPAREDNESS
On preparedness, the logical place to begin is with federal jurisdiction, as the federal
government has endeavoured to show leadership in emergency preparedness. In this respect,
Canada’s Emergency Management Act is the framework legislation that sets out the federal
government’s planning and coordinating obligations.79 The EMA (Canada) delegates
authority to the federal Minister of Public Safety and Preparedness, who heads Public Safety
Canada. Amongst other things, the Minister’s preparedness responsibilities include: (1)
establishing policies that guide the development, testing, maintenance, and implementation
of emergency management plans; (2) “monitoring potential, imminent and actual
emergencies”; and (3) supporting and coordinating emergency management initiatives
amongst the provinces.80 In addition, the EMA (Canada) requires individual ministers to
engage in emergency preparedness by identifying risks within their departments, and to
77 Ibid.
78 Forcese, supra note 74 at 361 suggests that the difference between disaster and emergency is a matter
of timing. As elaborated below, a vulnerability perspective reveals the limitations of separating out the
harm (that is, the disaster) from the institutional response (that is, the emergency) reflected in these
definitions.
79 SC 2007, c 15 [EMA (Canada)].
80 Ibid, s 4(1).
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prepare, maintain, test, and implement emergency management plans with respect to those
risks.81 
Public Safety Canada has produced an Emergency Management Planning Guide that
offers instructions to public institutions on how to prepare an emergency management plan.82
The EMP Guide advises that emergency management teams carry out multiple assessments
prior to drafting a plan, including: (1) identifying and assessing critical assets and services
(for example, critical government buildings and communications); (2) identifying and
assessing vulnerabilities of those assets and services and existing safeguards; and (3)
identifying, assessing, and evaluating all hazards and risks (for example, wildfire, hazardous
material spill, and cyber-attack).83 
The EMA (Canada) mandates that the federal government maintain multiple emergency
management plans: those with respect to the federal government’s centralized response to
an emergency, and those of individual departments with respect to specific hazards.84 The
Minister has implemented his preparedness obligations in part through the development of
the Federal Emergency Response Plan.85 The FERP identifies the circumstances in which
an integrated federal emergency response is required, including when a province or territory
requests federal support; an emergency affects multiple jurisdictions or federal assets,
services, or responsibilities; or “affects other aspects of the national interest.”86 
Federal departments must also develop “operational plans” to address the tactical aspects
of incident-specific emergency responses.87 They must also maintain business continuity
plans, which “enable critical services or products to be continually delivered to Canadians
in the event of an incident/emergency.”88 Concerns about transparency arise with respect to
emergency planning and preparedness because most of these plans are not publicly
available.89
81 Ibid, s 6.
82 EMP Guide, supra note 8.
83 Ibid at 11–21. The EMP Guide also describes a model governance structure for emergency management
(ibid at 23). See also Public Safety Canada, All Hazards Risk Assessment Methodology Guidelines
2012–2013 (Ottawa: PSC, 2012).
84 See e.g. Health Canada, Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan Part I: Master Plan, 5th ed (Ottawa: Health
Canada, 2014), online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/health-concerns/reports-
publications/emergencies-disasters/federal-nuclear-emergency-plan-part-1-master-plan.html>.
85 Public Safety Canada, Federal Emergency Response Plan (Ottawa: PSC, 2011), online: <https://www.
publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/mrgnc-rspns-pln/mrgnc-rspns-pln-eng.pdf> [FERP].
86 Ibid at 2.
87 EMP Guide, supra note 8 at 3; EMA (Canada), supra note 79, s 6(2).
88 EMP Guide, ibid (for example, by identifying alternate facilities such an emergency hospital).
89 Public Safety Canada’s website does not include government operational plans or business continuity
plans: see “Emergency Management Planning” (Otttawa: PSC, 2016), online: <https://www.public
safety.gc.ca/cnt/mrgnc-mngmnt/mrgnc-prprdnss/mrgnc-mngmnt-plnnng-en.aspx>. Environment and
Climate Change Canada has only high-level descriptions of its emergency management practices: see
“Environmental Emergencies: National Environmental Emergencies Centre” (Ottawa: Government of
Canada, 2017), online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/environmental-
emergencies-program/national-centre.html>. Emergency management plans are not listed or provided
on the Natural Resources Canada website, although a 2014 publicly-available audit identifies that
Natural Resources Canada has developed and maintained to a reasonable standard nine of these plans:
Natural Resources Canada,  Audit of NRCan’s Management Framework for Responsibilities Under the
Emergency Management Act (EMA) (AU1502) (Ottawa: NRC, 2014), online: <www.nrcan.gc.ca/audit/
reports/2014/17039>.
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Finally, in accordance with the legislated responsibilities, the federal government
maintains a Government Operations Centre (GOC), which is responsible for “24/7
monitoring and reporting, national-level situational awareness, warning products and
integrated risk assessments, as well as national-level planning and whole-of-government
response management.”90 The GOC carries out the actual work of emergency preparedness
by continually assessing and updating emergency management plans in coordination with
the provinces and territories, conducting training exercises, and providing support to senior
public officials and keeping them apprised of potential threats.91 The GOC was activated
during the Fort McMurray wildfire to ensure “federal efforts were coordinated to support the
Province of Alberta.”92
This basic four-part structure is replicated at the provincial level. The Alberta Emergency
Management Act legislates multiple stages of the disaster cycle.93 It constitutes an
Emergency Management Agency,94 which takes the lead in disaster preparedness. Pursuant
to regulations under the EMA (Alta), the Agency “shall … develop, implement and maintain
a comprehensive plan to be known as the ‘Alberta Emergency Plan.’”95 And the province
institutionalizes these preparedness requirements through a government operations centre.
The Alberta Emergency Plan has several mandatory components, including additional
plans developed in coordination with relevant government departments. While the Alberta
Emergency Plan is not publicly available,96 several of the more specific plans are. Business
continuity plans serve the same purpose as their federal counterparts; that is, to ensure
continuity in the delivery of essential government services during a period of disruption.97
Hazard-specific management plans set out actions for all stages of the disaster cycle with
respect to specific kinds of disasters.98 For example, the Alberta Wildland / Urban Interface
Fires plan states that it provides “a comprehensive … [s]trategy designed to prevent and
mitigate the effects of an interface fire, prepare for fire events, respond effectively … and
efficiently recover from the effects of wildfires.”99 In terms of preparedness, the plan sets out
even further planning requirements, namely a detailed emergency plan that includes, amongst
other requirements, key contact information, standing firefighting resource inventory, a list
of prioritized critical infrastructure, and significant dangerous goods sites. The Interface
90 Public Safety Canada, “Government Operations Centre (GOC)” (Ottawa: PSC, 2016), online: <https://
www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/mrgnc-mngmnt/rspndng-mrgnc-vnts/gvrnmnt-prtns-cntr-en.aspx>.
91 Ibid.
92 Defence Research and Development Canada, News Release, “Supporting Emergency Management
Officials During the Fort McMurray Wildfire Response” (2 May 2017), online: <www.drdc-
rddc.gc.ca/en/dynamic-article.page?doc=supporting-emergency-management-officials-during-the-fort-
mcmurray-wildfire-response/j1wgdft5>.
93 RSA 2000, c E-6.8 [EMA (Alta)].
94 Ibid, s 3.1.
95 Government Emergency Management Regulation, Alta Reg 248/2007, s 2(1)(c) [GEMR].
96 The lack of public accessibility of this central aspect of emergency preparedness is of concern. One can
imagine reasons why some portions of the plan ought to be confidential — to protect personal contact
information or for security reasons — but public scrutiny is a vital means of ensuring adequacy of
preparedness.
97 GEMR, supra note 95, s 1(c). See Alberta Emergency Management Agency, Government of Alberta
Business Continuity Plan (Edmonton: AEMA, 2013), online: <www.aema.alberta.ca/documents/GOA_
BCP_2014.pdf>.
98 GEMR, ibid, ss 1(d), 2(1)(e).
99 Alberta Emergency Management Agency, Alberta Wildland / Urban Interface Fires: A Guide for
Municipal Directors of Emergency Management and Consequence Management Officers (Edmonton:
AEMA, 2015) at 5, online: <www.aema.alberta.ca/documents/Alberta-Wildland-Urban-Interface-
Fires.pdf> [emphasis in original] [AEMA, Interface Fires].
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Fires plan requires that this detailed emergency plan be rehearsed through exercises and
training of emergency responders.
A comprehensive post-fire assessment of the government response, commissioned by the
provincial government, identified the absence of several crucial preparedness plans that
affected Alberta’s response to and recovery from the wildfire. For example, the report noted
the lack of a provincial Emergency Evacuation Framework that would take advantage of
known modeling and simulation tools to identify appropriate evacuation routes.100 The report
also identified the absence of clear processes in the Alberta Emergency Plan for who is
delegated authority under the plan and how that authority must be exercised.101 The absence
of these key plans emphasizes the need for greater transparency in emergency preparedness.
At present, it is not clear to the public whether important plans (for example, an evacuation
plan) exist but are not publicly-accessible, or do not exist at all.
Like its federal counterpart, the province also maintains a round-the-clock Provincial
Operations Centre, which was fully activated during the Fort McMurray wildfire.102 After the
wildfire, the provincial government announced the investment of $125 million for
modernizing the Provincial Operations Centre to become a leader in emergency response.103
Again, these four features are present at the municipal level. The EMA (Alta) requires
local authorities to maintain an “emergency management agency,” which is also required to
prepare and coordinate local emergency plans and programs.104 The Regional Municipal
Authority of Wood Buffalo has complied with this legislated requirement, establishing an
emergency management agency that consists of the Mayor and Councillors of the
municipality.105 Like its provincial and federal counterparts, this local agency is required, in
accordance with the bylaw and provincial legislation, to “prepare and coordinate emergency
plans and programs” for the region.106 Wood Buffalo maintains a general Municipal
Emergency Management Plan that allows for a flexible response to any type of emergency.107
Finally, Wood Buffalo’s Regional Emergency Operations Centre was activated during the
Fort McMurray wildfire.108 
The lack of transparency of many of the crucial plans makes it difficult to definitively
assess both the approach and adequacy of the contents of these plans. The lack of public
100 KPMG LLP, supra note 22 at 66.
101 Ibid at 58.
102 Alberta Emergency Management Agency, “Provincial Operations Centre (POC)” (Edmonton: AEMA,
2017), online: <www.aema.alberta.ca/provinicial-operations-centre>; Government of Alberta, Home
Again, supra note 17 at 7.
103 Alberta, Treasury Board and Finance, Budget 2017: Working to Make Life Better: Fiscal Plan
(Edmonton: Treasury Board and Finance, 2017) at 42–43, online: <www.finance.alberta.ca/publications/
budget/budget2017/fiscal-plan-complete.pdf>.
104 Supra note 93, s 11.2.
105 Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo, by-law No 09/036, Emergency Management Agency Bylaw
(17 November 2009).
106 Ibid, s 12(a).
107 Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo, “Emergency Management Branch,” online: <www.rmwb.ca/
Municipal-Government/municipal_departments/Emergency-Services---Law-Enforcement/Emergency-
Management.htm>.
108 Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo, RMWB 2016 Wildfire Recovery Plan (Fort McMurray:
RMWB, 2016) at 9 [RMWB, Recovery Plan].
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accessibility raises questions about the efficacy of these plans in addition to deeper questions
about their legal and democratic authority.109 
2. THE ABSENCE OF A VULNERABILITY PERSPECTIVE
The legal requirements of preparedness do not incorporate the multi-dimensional concept
of vulnerability, introduced in Part II. In contrast to the context-sensitive notion of
vulnerability, which attends to the particular intersections between social and ecological
relationships, the law of disaster preparedness is technical and uniform in nature.
First, the legal division between “disaster” and “emergency,” noted above, foreshadows
the problem. Canadian governments do not engage in disaster management, which
foregrounds harm and vulnerability as the central features of a disaster. Rather, Canadian
governments engage in emergency management, which focuses on the institutional practices
of managing emergencies (or disasters, on this article’s definition). This risks emergency
management becoming a set of technical practices of institutional coordination, disconnected
from their ultimate purpose.
For example, Canada’s EMP Guide, the key document instructing departments on all
stages of the disaster cycle, requires public officials to conduct vulnerability assessments.
However, “vulnerability” is used as a technical term that does not capture the multi-
dimensionality of the concept explored in Part II. The EMP Guide describes vulnerability as
“an inadequacy or gap in the design, implementation or operation of an asset that could
enable a threat or hazard to cause injury or disruption.”110 Vulnerability, in this context,
seems to apply to the emergency management process itself.111 This is an important facet of
disaster management to be sure. We want our institutions to engage in these management
practices to ensure they have the training, resources, and organization to respond to all
hazards our communities may face. However, that this is the only reference to vulnerability
in the law of disaster preparedness is striking in light of the concept’s multi-faceted analytical
and practical potential.
Second, the EMP Guide focuses on hazards, assets, and services but does not address the
underlying factors that contribute to social vulnerability. Despite this basic insight on
vulnerability from disaster research and international practice, there is no federal policy
framework developed under the EMA (Canada) that identifies which individuals or
communities are most vulnerable to disasters. Nor is there any formal guidance to decision-
makers that they ought to take steps to identify these groups when developing an emergency
plan. 
109 Jocelyn Stacey, “The Environmental, Democratic, and Rule-of-Law Implications of Harper’s
Environmental Assessment Legacy” (2016) 21:2 Rev Const Stud 165 (on how changes to federal
environmental assessment laws undermined the democratic and legal legitimacy of Canadian
environmental law).
110 Supra note 8 at 16.
111 The EMP Guide offers the following as examples of vulnerabilities: “personnel issues (e.g. high
turnover, inadequately trained individuals)”; “insufficient secondary or support processes”; and “existing
[Emergency Management] plans that are immature and have not been tested” (ibid).
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To take one example, if we focus in on one known vulnerable group, Indigenous
Canadians, it becomes even more apparent that Canadian disaster law fails to adopt a
vulnerability perspective. Canada’s Auditor General reported on emergency management on
reserve land, highlighting the special vulnerability faced by First Nations communities due
to “poor socio-economic conditions, low education levels, and few economic opportunities”
in addition to “isolation and geographic location.”112 The Auditor General noted chronic and
repeated exposure to hazards such as flooding, wildfire, and unsafe drinking water.113
The federal approach to disaster management on reserves is contained in the National On-
reserve Emergency Management Plan. The plan states that “[t]he responsibility to deal with
emergency incidents starts at home with the individual” and recommends that individuals
have a 72-hour emergency preparedness kit.114 As the starting point of the plan, this
recommendation fails to reflect the level of poverty experienced on many reserves that
prevents many from making ends meet during ordinary times, not to mention times of
crisis.115 The National On-reserve Management Plan further affirms that emergency
management is the responsibility of the local community. Yet there is no guaranteed funding
or resources to enable First Nations communities to adequately conduct emergency
management activities.116 Unsurprisingly — but of tremendous concern — the Auditor
General found that less than half of the studied First Nations’ emergency plans had assessed
the hazards and risks faced by the community, leaving these communities unnecessarily
vulnerable to disaster harm.117
This lack of attention to vulnerable communities in Canadian disaster law reveals the
importance of analyzing disasters in all their socio-ecological dimensions, rather than relying
exclusively on an all-hazards analysis of emergencies. This is because very different
communities are typically vulnerable to environmental hazards, rather than emergencies
arising from national security concerns. Terrorist actions are intentionally high-visibility
events that do not obviously discriminate based on race or socio-economic status.118 Research
on disaster vulnerability reveals that disasters are not the social equalizers they were once
thought to be.119 Rather, empirical evidence demonstrates that disaster harm is
disproportionately suffered by communities that are already marginalized, such as Canada’s
Indigenous communities.
112 Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2013 Fall Report of the Auditor General of Canada (Ottawa:
Auditor General of Canada, 2013) ch 6, online: <www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_
201311_06_e_38800.html> [2013 Fall Report].
113 Ibid, 6.16–6.18.
114 Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, National On-reserve Emergency Management Plan (Ottawa:
INAC) at 6–7, online: <https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ-AP/STAGING/texte-
text/emergency_plan_1496943857348_eng.pdf>.
115 See generally Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, “The Community Well-Being (CWB) Index,
1981-2011” (Ottawa: INAC, 2015), online: <https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1419864229405/
1419864303946>.
116 Indigenous Services Canada now runs an Emergency Management Assistance Program, to which
interested First Nations communities must apply to receive project specific funding: Indigenous Services
Canada, “Emergency Management Assistance Program: Funded Projects 2016–2017” (Gatineau: ISC,
2017), online: <https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1488801706500/1488801742929>.
117 2013 Fall Report, supra note 112 at para 6.30.
118 Such actions do not tend to discriminate other than that they tend to be urban, whereas disasters can be
anywhere. To the extent that wealthier individuals participate in activities that might attract terrorist
plots (for example, travelling by air or attending a concert), they would be more exposed to these
hazards than those who do not participate in these activities (whether by choice or ability). 
119 Verchick, Facing Catastrophe, supra note 40 at 190.
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Indeed, multiple First Nations and Métis communities were affected by the Fort
McMurray wildfire, in addition to the hardest-hit neighbourhoods in Fort McMurray being
home to the majority of Fort McMurray’s Indigenous population.120 Yet the effects of the
disaster on these communities is largely absent from official responses.121 Moreover, neither
the provincial or federal government has used the Fort McMurray wildfire as an opportunity
to extrapolate any broader lessons for First Nations emergency management, despite the fact
that First Nations are the largest population affected by wildfire evacuation in Canada.122 
A necessary first step for Canadian disaster law to begin to incorporate a vulnerability
perspective is for disaster preparedness to refocus on vulnerable communities. Legal
requirements and policy guidelines must direct emergency managers to identify vulnerable
communities and populations when crafting mandatory emergency plans. These requirements
must manifest at each level of government. While local governments are best positioned to
understand their own communities and the marginalized and vulnerable populations within
them, leadership and support must come from provincial and federal governments. Provincial
emergency legislation ought to mandate that emergency plans identify and attend to
vulnerable communities. Federal leadership, at the very least, could come in the form of
dictating a methodology for officials who are required to carry out these tasks. Failing to
incorporate these requirements into the law of disaster planning exacerbates community
vulnerability.
B. THE LAW OF DISASTER RESPONSE
The law of disaster response has two key features mirrored at each level of government:
(1) the legislated ability to declare a state of emergency; and (2) special delegated powers to
respond to the emergency. These features operationalize the “toggle switch” approach to
disasters, introduced above, meaning that these special sets of powers govern during a state
of emergency, in contrast to the operation of ordinary legislative requirements that apply at
all other times.
Disaster response is addressed in the first and second instances by the local and provincial
governments. Provincial legislation, for example, the EMA (Alta), is therefore the focal point
of the emergency response. The EMA (Alta) draws the same distinction between “disaster”
and “emergency”123 as the inter-governmental framework introduced above, with “disaster”
focusing on the harm and the “emergency” focusing on the immediate cause of the disaster
and the institutional response.
120 Shari Narine, “Impact of Wildfire on Indigenous Residents to be Studied,” Windspeaker (28 March
2017), online: <www.windspeaker.com/news/windspeaker-news/impact-of-wildfire-on-indigenous-
residents-to-be-studied/>.
121 Government of Alberta, Home Again, supra note 17 at 10, 26 (provincial support for restoring lost
traplines); KPMG LLP, supra note 22 at 36, 77 (on special communications challenges with Indigenous
communities). The Red Cross, however, has committed to funding a study on the impacts of the Fort
McMurray wildfire on Indigenous people: David Thurton, “Impact of Wildfire on Fort McMurray
Indigenous Communities to be Studied,” CBC News (9 November 2016), online:
<www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/impact-of-wildfire-on-fort-mcmurray-indigenous-communities-to-
be-studied-1.3842391>.
122 Canadian Council of Forest Ministers, Canadian Wildland Fire Strategy: A 10-year Review and
Renewed Call to Action (Ottawa: Natural Resources Canada, 2016) at 9, online: <www.cfs.nrcan.gc.ca/
pubwarehouse/pdfs/37108.pdf>. 
123 Supra note 93, ss 1(e)–(f).
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The EMA (Alta) delegates power to the municipalities to declare states of local
emergency124 and to the Lieutenant Governor in Council to declare a provincial state of
emergency.125 The EMA (Alta) does not set out conditions required to constitute an
emergency. Rather, it requires only that the local government or Lieutenant Governor in
Council “is satisfied” that an emergency exists.126 The declaration must disclose the nature
of the emergency and the area of the province to which it applies.127 Due to the urgency of
the circumstances, the EMA (Alta) requires the declaration to be published immediately in
whatever manner is likely to reach the majority of the affected population.128 
These states of emergency can be terminated at any time by the delegated authority.129
Local and provincial states of emergency have legislated sunset periods, meaning that in the
absence of an affirmative renewal, the declaration automatically lapses.130 A provincial state
of emergency pertaining to the same area immediately supersedes the state of local
emergency and causes it to be of no force or effect.131
The Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo has elaborated these powers through its
municipal bylaws. Under the relevant bylaw, the Mayor has the power to declare a state of
local emergency.132 The Mayor declared a state of local emergency for Fort McMurray at
10:00 p.m. on 1 May 2016. A state of local emergency followed for Athabasca Chipewyan
First Nation on 3 May 2016. Notices were published through Alberta Emergency Alert
notifications and circulated through government news releases and social media, but the post-
fire audit identified the need for an improved coordinated communications strategy.133 On
4 May 2016, the provincial government declared a state of provincial emergency through a
brief Order in Council, stating:
WHEREAS the Lieutenant Governor in Council is satisfied that an emergency exists in the Regional
Municipality of Wood Buffalo as a result of wildfires, which have caused extraordinary losses and damages
to residents, businesses and others.
…
THEREFORE the Lieutenant Governor in Council declares that a state of emergency exists in the Regional
Municipality of Wood Buffalo.134
The EMA (Alta) delegates special emergency powers to local authorities operating under
a state of local emergency as well as to the Minister during a state of provincial emergency.
These powers include implementing the emergency plan, acquiring real or personal property
needed to respond to the emergency, controlling or prohibiting travel to regions of the
124 Ibid, s 21(1).
125 Ibid, s 18(1).
126 Ibid, ss 18(1), 21(1).
127 Ibid, ss 18(2), 21(2).
128 Ibid, ss 18(3), 21(3).
129 Ibid, ss 18(4), 22(4).
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid, s 22 (3).
132 Emergency Management Agency Bylaw, supra note 105, s 14.
133 KPMG LLP, supra note 22 at 79–82.
134 OIC 107/2016, supra note 29.
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province, and ordering evacuations.135 The latter power was exercised repeatedly during the
Fort McMurray wildfire, with the municipal government issuing ever-expanding mandatory
evacuation orders on 3 May 2016 and subsequent evacuation orders issued by the province
as the fire spread north of the city.136 However, the post-fire assessment noted inconsistency
in the implementation of the emergency response between the local and provincial levels.
The assessment recommended changing the legislation to require a uniform incident response
system across all local authorities.137 
At the federal level, the Emergencies Act138 contains the same toggle switch approach that
enables the declaration of a federal state of emergency and special response actions. For
reasons we will see in a moment, the federal government did not declare a state of emergency
during the Fort McMurray wildfire; however, it did respond in other ways. 
Canada’s EA is the more circumscribed successor to the War Measures Act, which
delegated sweeping authority to the executive upon the declaration of a state of emergency.139
Unlike the provincial legislation, the federal EA specifies four distinct categories of
emergencies: public welfare emergency, public order emergency, international emergency,
and war emergency.140 Each category has different prerequisites to the declaration of a state
of emergency and different emergency response powers that are delegated to the executive
during a state of emergency. Significantly, in each instance, the event must be a “national
emergency” or what the legislation defines as:
[A]n urgent and critical situation of a temporary nature that
(a) seriously endangers the lives, health or safety of Canadians and is of such proportions or nature
as to exceed the capacity or authority of a province to deal with it, or
(b) seriously threatens the ability of the Government of Canada to preserve the sovereignty,
security and territorial integrity of Canada
and that cannot be effectively dealt with under any other law of Canada.141
Disasters such as wildfires, floods, storms, epidemics, and accidents or pollution are
categorized as public welfare emergencies by the legislation.142 The Governor in Council
may declare a state of emergency in response to one of these events “that results or may
result in a danger to life or property, social disruption or a breakdown in the flow of essential
goods, services or resources, so serious as to be a national emergency.”143 During a state of
public welfare emergency, the Governor in Council is empowered to make numerous kinds
of orders which it “believes, on reasonable grounds, are necessary,” including orders
135 EMA (Alta), supra note 93, s 19(1).
136 See “Wildfire,” supra note 23. Note that there is no legislative authority to compel someone to comply
with a mandatory evacuation order. The post-fire assessment recommended considering an amendment
to the legislation to create an offence for non-compliance: KPMG LLP, supra note 22 at 66–67.
137 KPMG LLP, ibid at 85.
138 RSC 1985, c 22 (4th Supp) [EA].
139 See e.g. Peter Rosenthal, “The New Emergencies Act: Four Times the War Measures Act” (1991) 20:3
Man LJ 563.
140 Supra note 138, ss 5, 16, 27, 37.
141 Ibid, s 3.
142 Ibid, s 5.
143 Ibid, ss 5–6.
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pertaining to the regulation or prohibition of travel to certain areas, evacuations, requisition
or use of property, establishment of emergency shelters, as well as the imposition of fines
and terms of imprisonment for violating these orders.144
The EA has never been invoked. This is likely due to the high threshold posed by the
definition of “national emergency.” The typically geographically-defined nature of most
disasters means they are unlikely to meet the requirements of a national emergency.145 
Under the EMA (Canada) and National Defence Act, however, the federal government is
empowered to play a supportive role in provincial disaster response efforts.146 Both Acts
empower the federal government to provide assistance to the provinces during provincial
emergencies. Under the EMA (Canada), the federal Minister of Public Safety and
Preparedness can provide financial assistance for disaster response upon declaring a
provincial emergency a matter of “concern to the federal government.”147 On 2 June 2016,
the provincial government requested financial assistance for the response to the Beast. The
federal government responded by declaring the provincial emergency “to be of concern to
the federal government” and authorizing the Minister to provide financial assistance.148 
In addition, provincial attorneys general are able to call upon the Canadian Armed Forces
“in aid of the civil power in any case in which a riot or disturbance of the peace” exceeds the
powers of civil authorities.149 National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces has
established “Operation LENTUS,” a standing operation that provides humanitarian assistance
and disaster response support when a disaster overwhelms the capacity of the province or
territory.150 On 4 May 2016, the province requested assistance from the armed forces.
Operation LENTUS deployed 65 personnel, five helicopters, and an aircraft to assist with
transporting evacuees, firefighters, and freight during the peak period of emergency
response.151
The role of law in delineating the conditions for the toggle switch to emergency powers
is well-established.152 Accordingly, the legal requirements for emergency powers and
mechanisms for intergovernmental coordination are clearly delineated in both federal and
provincial legislation. 
The challenge that arises at the response stage is that of realizing the coordination amongst
jurisdictions that is anticipated by statute. The implementation of these emergency powers
in response to the Beast highlighted the need to improve capacity at the local level to ensure
144 Ibid, ss 8(1)(a)–(j).
145 However, one can imagine a scenario in which an extreme event struck a provincial capital city,
incapacitating the provincial government and requiring the federal government to step in to assume
responsibility for the response.
146 National Defence Act, RSC 1985, c N-5 [NDA]. The federal government also has specific disaster
response obligations with respect to its areas of exclusive jurisdiction: see e.g. Railway Safety Act, RSC
1985, c 32 (4th Supp); Nuclear Safety and Control Act, SC 1997, c 9.
147 Supra note 79, ss 4(1)(j), 7(c).
148 Provincial Emergency Financial Assistance Order No 197, PC 2016-0525 (14 June 2016).
149 NDA, supra note 146, s 275.
150 National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces, “Operation LENTUS,” online: <www.forces.gc.ca/en/
operations-canada-north-america/op-lentus.page>.
151 Ibid.
152 See e.g. Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948); Gross & Aoláin, supra note 67, ch 1.
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a consistent approach between local and provincial authorities. While coordination may
perhaps appear an excessively bureaucratic detail, it is crucial to ensuring that vulnerable
communities do not fall through the cracks in disaster response.
C. THE LAW OF DISASTER RECOVERY
The law of disaster recovery focuses principally on compensation for harm suffered during
disasters.153 This section provides a more comprehensive map of the law of disaster recovery.
After first discussing the compensatory aspects of the law of recovery, it identifies the
“ordinary” non-emergency laws that have particular salience during the recovery stage. It
argues that these planning and development laws are essential to fulfilling the recovery
objective of building back better (that is, the goal of rebuilding communities so they are more
resilient to future hazards).
1. COMPENSATION
The compensatory aspect of recovery itself has three components: (1) private insurance;
(2) tort law; and (3) legislated compensation and disaster relief programs. The first two
components will be addressed relatively briefly as they are their own distinct areas of law
and cannot be addressed in great depth within the scope of this article. 
Disaster compensation raises basic questions about who ought to bear the risk of disaster
loss: individuals or the state. The availability of private insurance shifts that obligation to
individuals. Fire is typically an insurable event.154 In the instance of the Fort McMurray
wildfire, insurance companies report that they anticipate spending $3.6 billion for the
recovery from the 2016 Fort McMurray wildfire.155 Whether any significant legal issues arise
from the adjudication of claims from this wildfire remains to be seen.
Disasters pose challenges for private insurers due to their unpredictable, significant, and
concentrated losses that make it difficult for insurers to spread risk. As a result, private
insurance plans often exclude coverage for disasters. For example, until recently, private
insurance has not covered flood loss in Canada.156 Current flood insurance coverage is
expensive because only those at risk are likely to purchase coverage.157 This evidences a
central challenge inherent to the logic of insurance: setting the right price to incentivize
individuals to purchase insurance while still ensuring companies can pay out claims when
a major event occurs. Climate change exacerbates these challenges by increasing
uncertainties for insurance companies, exacerbating multiple correlated risks (for example,
153 AEMA, Interface Fires, supra note 99 at 14–15. The Public Safety Canada webpage on recovery is
exclusively focused on compensation: “Recovery from Disasters” (Ottawa: PSC, 2017), online:
<https://www. publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/mrgnc-mngmnt/rcvr-dsstrs/index-en.aspx>. See also Farber, supra
note 41 at 1787.
154 The Insurance Bureau of Canada outlines disaster coverage that is typically covered in standard home
insurance policies: “Disaster,” online: <www.ibc.ca/bc/disaster> (noting that overland flood insurance
and earthquake coverage are not included in standard policies).
155 Government of Alberta, Home Again, supra note 17 at 25.
156 Jason Thistlethwaite, “The Emergence of Flood Insurance in Canada: Navigating Institutional
Uncertainty” (2017) 37:4 Risk Analysis 744.
157 Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, Estimate of the Average Annual Cost for Disaster Financial
Assistance Arrangements due to Weather Events (Ottawa: PBO, 2016) at 11, online: <www.pbo-
dpb.gc.ca/web/default/files/Documents/Reports/2016/DFAA/DFAA_EN.pdf>.
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wildfire and flooding), and threatening insurers with the possibility of claims that are
overwhelming in terms of both amount and number.158 Climate-related disasters thus force
us to revisit basic questions of both policy and institutional design for insuring against
expected, but ultimately unpredictable and likely extreme losses.
Individuals who suffer harm or loss can attempt to obtain compensation from those
responsible. Ordinarily, principles of tort liability mediate this relationship. In the limited
existing disaster law literature, one scholar has argued our increasingly sophisticated
sociological understanding of disasters allows for an increased scope for liability.159 He
observes that, in prominent instances worldwide, defendants in tort actions have been less
able to rely on unforeseeability defences, such as the act of God defence. As disasters are
increasingly understood as expected, if not entirely predictable occurrences, courts have
begun to require that public and private actors account for the possibility of disaster when
taking actions that affect others.160
While these defences may be verging on extinction, the ability to successfully claim
damages in tort for disaster harm remains significantly restricted. Litigation after Hurricane
Katrina demonstrated the difficulty of proving the negligence of public authorities in disaster
prevention because disaster prevention decisions are typically considered policy decisions
that are not the subject of liability.161 Similarly, in Canada, potential plaintiffs would face the
doctrinal challenge of establishing their proximity to the public authority162 and navigating
the policy-operational dichotomy which generally protects governments from liability for
policy decisions.163
These doctrinal hurdles would also apply to the disaster response actions taken by public
authorities. In addition, emergency response actions are covered by statutory immunity
clauses that protect public authorities from liability for actions taken in good faith. The
federal EA164 and the provincial EMA (Alta)165 contain immunity clauses that protect
ministers, agents of the Crown, and local authorities against liability for any action or
omission made in good faith pursuant to the emergency legislation. The provincial legislation
contains further immunity against actions in negligence for actions taken in good faith by
search and rescue organizations while acting under an agreement with the Minister.166 
158 See Sean B Hecht, “Climate Change and the Transformation of Risk: Insurance Matters” (2008) 55:6
UCLA L Rev 1559.
159 Lauta, supra note 35 at 105.
160 For example, the corporate defendant at fault in the Fukushima disaster did not mount a defence based
on the statutory immunity clause for natural disasters of “exceptional character” because of the accepted
view that the tsunami was an anticipated occurrence and not of “exceptional character” (ibid at 123).
161 Ibid (noting changes in the doctrine with a later-reversed lower court finding that failing to maintain the
levees “was not policy, but insouciance, myopia and shortsightedness” at 29, citing In re Katrina Canal
Breaches Consolidated Litigation, 647 F Supp (2d) 644 (ED La 2009) at 732).
162 See e.g. Eliopoulos (Litigation Trustee of) v Ontario (Minister of Health and Long-Term Care) (2006),
82 OR (3d) 321 (CA), leave to appeal to SCC refused, 31783 (24 May 2007) (no duty of care to prevent
the spread of the West Nile virus). 
163 See e.g. R v Imperial Tobacco Ltd, 2011 SCC 42, [2001] 3 SCR 45. For a general discussion of this
notoriously tricky doctrine, see Lewis N Klar & Cameron SG Jefferies, Tort Law, 6th ed (Toronto:
Thomson Reuters, 2017) at 364–74.
164 Supra note 138, s 47(1).
165 Supra note 93, ss 27–28.
166 Ibid, s 29.
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Some of these aspects of tort doctrine and statutory protections have legitimate policy
rationales. They serve to limit judicial overreach into thorny policy issues pertaining to
disaster prevention, and recognize that emergency response actions are taken in the heat of
the moment, often with limited information. But international experience with disaster
prevention and response highlights a striking number of instances in which incompetent,
indifferent, and profligate actions by public officials, in particular, have significantly
contributed to disaster harm.167 This suggests that tort law could play a much more extensive
role in compensating those who have suffered disaster harm. Moreover, experience in the
United States suggests that a plausible claim in tort is an important factor in prompting the
government to establish adequate compensation funds,168 to which this section now turns. 
Legislated compensation and disaster relief programs are more complex in structure. Most
directly, both provincial and federal legislation provide that, if the government acquires,
utilizes, damages, or destroys any personal or real property during its emergency response,
it shall provide reasonable compensation for the loss.169 
Above and beyond this form of compensation, both the province and federal governments
have detailed programs for providing broader financial disaster relief for uninsured losses.
The EMA (Alta) constitutes a Disaster Relief Fund, which is administered by a Disaster
Relief Committee.170 The Disaster Recovery Regulation sets out how the funds are to be
disbursed in the aftermath of a disaster.171 For “localized disasters”172 — extraordinary events
that affect a small number of people — those individuals apply to a Director for
compensation for eligible losses.173 For widespread disasters, such as the Fort McMurray
wildfire, the Minister establishes a disaster recovery program with specific terms and
conditions for compensation, forms in which the compensation will be provided, and any
special provisions for assessment of damage and loss.174
Disaster recovery programs are administered through the Alberta Emergency Management
Agency. Affected municipalities apply on behalf of their residents.175 Fort McMurray initially
received $87.5 million in disaster recovery program funding to help the city pay for the
167 Hurricane Katrina stands out here: see Klar & Jefferies, supra note 163. See also Penny Green, “Disaster
by Design: Corruption, Construction and Catastrophe” (2005) 45:4 Brit J Crim 528 (examining a series
of earthquakes in Turkey and arguing that state power, corruption, and corporate power “combine as
state crime to create earthquake disasters” at 528).
168 See discussion in Verchick, Facing Catastrophe, supra note 40 at 179–80.
169 EMA (Alta), supra note 93, ss 19(3), 24(1.1); Byron Hills Resources Ltd v Alberta (Sustainable Resource
Development), 2009 ABQB 292, 473 AR 71 (on the applicability of the compensatory provisions of
predecessor legislation to EMA (Alta)); EA, supra note 138, s 48(1).
170 EMA (Alta), ibid, s 12.
171 Disaster Recovery Regulation, Alta Reg 51/1994.
172 Ibid, s 1(d).
173 Ibid, ss 3, 9 (on eligible losses), s 5 (application procedure), ss 7–8 (appeal procedures).
174 Ibid, s 4. Note that the province also has Municipal Wildfire Assistance Programs that provide financial
assistance to municipalities for the costs directly associated with the suppression of wildfire, salaries of
firefighting personnel, fireguard construction, and so on: Alberta Emergency Management Agency,
“Municipal Wildfire Assistance Programs (MWAPs)” (Edmonton: AEMA, 2016), online: <www.aema.
alberta.ca/municipal-wildfire-assistance-programs>.
175 Alberta Emergency Management Agency, “Assistance and Recovery Support” (Edmonton: AEMA,
2017), online: <www.aema.alberta.ca/assistance-and-recovery-support>.
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response and recovery from the fire.176 In February 2017, the province announced an
additional $20 million would be disbursed through the program.177 
Canada also administered disaster relief funding though the federal Disaster Financial
Assistance Arrangements (DFAA).178 The DFAA provides assistance to provincial and
territorial governments when response and recovery costs exceed their capability. The DFAA
has detailed guidelines for cost sharing arrangements between the affected province or
territory and the federal government.179 The province or territory must apply for the funding;
however, the DFAA will not cover expenses where “insurance coverage for a specific hazard
… was available in the area at reasonable cost.”180
The federal government provided its first installment of DFAA funding, $300 million, to
Alberta in June 2016.181 The Alberta government has reported on the use of the funding
(above and beyond covering the costs of the wildfire response). It announced that over $18
million would be spent on mental health initiatives in the recovery period, $4.8 million in
financial assistance would be allocated to evacuees to cover gaps in insurance, and an
additional $1.7 million would be disbursed to provide income support for low-income
households.182 While these initiatives are laudable, it is worth noting that there is nothing in
Alberta’s Disaster Recovery Regulation that requires funds be allocated toward vulnerable
groups. As vulnerable groups are, by definition, in the most precarious positions both before
and after disasters, access to these funds are especially important in ameliorating their
continued vulnerability.183 This specific focus on recovery re-emphasizes the significance of
the absence of any requirements at the planning stage that mandate and guide the
identification of vulnerable communities in advance of a disaster.
2. PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT
While compensation is often the focal point of disaster recovery, this section argues that
disaster law properly includes the suite of planning and development laws that take on a
heightened importance during disaster recovery. This section reveals, however, that existing
disaster law lacks formal connections between emergency laws and the planning and
development laws that are essential to communities building back better. In the aftermath of
the Beast, most significant recovery actions were taken in the absence of any specific legal
mandate to do so.
176 Government of Alberta, Home Again, supra note 17 at 32.
177 “Government of Alberta Advances Disaster Recovery Program Funding to Help with Fort McMurray
Uninsurable Costs,” Canadian Underwriter (24 February 2017), online: <https://www.canadian
underwriter.ca/insurance/government-alberta-advances-disaster-recovery-program-funding-help-fort-
mcmurray-uninsurable-costs-1004109363/>.
178 Pursuant to EMA (Canada), supra note 79, s 4(1)(j).
179 Public Safety Canada, Guidelines for the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (Ottawa: PSC,
2007), online: <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/mrgnc-mngmnt/rcvr-dsstrs/gdlns-dsstr-ssstnc/gdlns-
dsstr-ssstnc-eng.pdf> [DFAA Guidelines].
180 Ibid, s 3.1.2(b). A number of other losses are ineligible as well, including lost income, losses due to
ordinary or normal risks of a trade, and legal fees (ibid).
181 Alberta Municipal Affairs, News Release, “Governments of Canada and Alberta Announce Continued
Support for People of Fort McMurray” (17 June 2016),  online: <https://www.alberta.ca/release.cfm?x
ID=42944BBDA58F8-00F1-62F5-5D713EC19F3EFE86>.
182 Government of Alberta, Home Again, supra note 17 at 28, 30.
183 Verchick, Facing Catastrophe, supra note 40 at 178. 
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In most instances — as with the Fort McMurray wildfire — the applicable planning and
development law is at the provincial and local levels. Recovery from the Fort McMurray
wildfire was overseen by provincial and local Recovery Committees. The Alberta Recovery
Task Force was created through Order in Council, with a mandate to work with the
municipality and Indigenous communities to develop a recovery plan.184 The Wood Buffalo
Recovery Committee was constituted through bylaw with a mandate of working closely with
a Recovery Task Team that would implement recovery actions.185 The product of these
committees is the Wood Buffalo Recovery Plan, which “is intended to guide the recovery of
the entire region from a post-disaster state, coordinate rebuilding efforts using a build back
better philosophy and enhance community-level resiliency.”186
It is important to note two examples of “non-emergency” laws that take on heightened
importance during disaster recovery. First, environmental, health, and safety concerns are of
particular salience. Communities are vulnerable, not only to the direct harm from a disaster,
but also increased risks in its aftermath. Air and water quality, for example, were significant
concerns in the aftermath of the Fort McMurray wildfire. Air quality in the region was
compromised by particulate matter and potential toxins (ozone, heavy metals, refrigerants)
released from burnt buildings, industrial sites, cars, and the forest. Water treatment was
disrupted during the fire, leading to concerns about whether drinking water was safe to
consume.187 Recovery crews had to remove layers of ash to ensure that contaminants in the
ash were not transferred into the soil.188 Recovery also requires significant demolition and
reconstruction activities, bringing with it an influx of workers in construction and related
fields.189 These recovery activities are governed by provincial environmental laws190 and
occupational health and safety laws.191 
Yet the connection between these laws that operate at all times and disaster law is not
always clear. A significant finding of the post-fire assessment was that it was unclear during
a state of emergency which provincial departments “had the legislative authority to make
decisions regarding the appropriate health and safety thresholds for re-entry, particularly for
water safety, air quality and other potential hazards to public health.”192 Yet, the need for
close environmental monitoring and testing and any resulting environmental advisories
during the immediate recovery period of a disaster is entirely foreseeable. Accordingly, the
delineation of the roles and responsibilities of relevant departments and decision-makers
during the recovery period ought to be determined in advance. Similarly, need for expedited
184 OIC 109/2016, (Emergency Management Act).
185 Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo, by-law No 16/013, Consolidated Version of Wood Buffalo
Recovery Committee Bylaw (23 June 2016).
186 RMWB, Recovery Plan, supra note 108 at 13.
187 Government of Alberta, “Environmental Monitoring in Fort McMurray,” online: <https://www.alberta.
ca/environmental-monitoring-fort-mcmurray.aspx#water>. See generally Potable Water Regulation,
Alta Reg 277/2003, s 6.
188 Government of Alberta, “Fort McMurray Burned and Unburned Soil Samples” (Edmonton: Government
of Alberta, 2016), online: <https://www.alberta.ca/documents/FtMcMurray-SoilMonitoringDataMemo.
pdf>.
189 RMWB, Recovery Plan, supra note 108 at 29.
190 Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, RSA 2000, c E-12, s 14 (requirement to develop
ambient environmental quality objectives such as: Government of Alberta, “Alberta Ambient Air
Quality Objectives and Guidelines Summary,” Air Policy, 2016, No 2); Potable Water Regulation, supra
note 187, s 6 (on mandatory quality standards for drinking water).
191 Occupational Health and Safety Act, RSA 2000, c O-2.
192 KPMG LLP, supra note 22 at 46.
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demolition and rebuilding after a disaster is entirely foreseeable. Thus, the connection
between occupational health and safety laws and emergency law also ought to be clear.
As communities shift from short-term to long-term recovery, the focus also shifts from
immediate post-disaster risks to how to build the community so it is resilient to future
disasters. This engages the second set of vital “non-emergency” laws: planning and
development laws, which will impact whether a community builds back better.
Contemporary disaster research emphasizes the importance of the connection between its
recovery and prevention stages. The heightened public awareness of disasters during the
recovery stage often creates the opportunity for significant legal and policy change to
enhance prevention and mitigation.193 While early disaster research and practice focused on
the connection between preparedness and response, current research instructs that recovery
and prevention are critical moments for ameliorating community vulnerability and thus
realizing the goal of building back better.194
In the EM Framework, the federal government, provinces, and territories have committed
to a principle of building back better during the recovery phase of the disaster cycle.195
Building back better is a now ubiquitous concept in disaster management that highlights the
“need to place environmental hazards within the wider contexts of building sustainable
communities and not re-creating or exacerbating vulnerabilities.”196 Building back better
bridges recovery efforts with mitigation. 
In the context of the Beast, however, building back better is not reflected in any specific
legal requirements. The governments of Alberta and Canada have, thus far, taken a very light
touch to building back better, offering financial incentives (or creating disincentives). The
federal DFAA Guidelines allow for additional funding to provinces for projects that contain
mitigation enhancements to reduce vulnerability to future disasters.197 This allows provinces
to receive slightly more than the baseline replacement cost of damaged or destroyed
infrastructure. In the aftermath of the southern Alberta flooding in 2013, the province
amended legislation to allow for the promulgation of regulations prohibiting development
in floodways.198 However, no regulations have been promulgated, and Fort McMurray was
intended to be exempt in any event.199 Despite one of the heavily-damaged Fort McMurray
neighbourhoods being located in a flood zone, the province does not appear to have
implemented any measures to prohibit or discourage development in this area.200
The philosophy of building back better is closely tied into the broad network of municipal
planning and development laws. After temporarily prohibiting redevelopment in heavily-
193 Olshansky & Chang, supra note 72 at 201.
194 Ibid. See also Jane C Ingram et al, “Post-Disaster Recovery Dilemmas: Challenges in Balancing Short-
term and Long-term Needs for Vulnerability Reduction” (2006) 9:7 Environmental Science & Policy
607. The importance of recovery is acknowledged in EM Framework, supra note 8 at 8.
195 EM Framework, ibid.
196 Jim Kennedy et al, “The Meaning of ‘Build Back Better’: Evidence From Post-Tsunami Aceh and
Sri Lanka” (2008) 16:1 J Contingencies & Crisis Management 24 at 25.
197 Supra note 179 at 3.3.
198 Municipal Government Act, RSA 2000, c M-26, s 693.1. 
199 Alberta Municipal Affairs, “Overview of Bill 27, Floodway Development Regulation Consultation”
(Edmonton: Municipal Affairs, 2014), online: <www.municipalaffairs.alberta.ca/1934>.
200 Government of Alberta, Home Again, supra note 17 at 41.
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affected areas (due to health and safety concerns),201 the municipality began issuing the
necessary permits to restore destroyed and damaged infrastructure in the city. As of 3
November 2017, the municipality had conducted nearly 2,600 demolition inspections,
approved 1,057 development permits (a prerequisite for reconstruction), and approved 1,183
building permits.202 However, there is nothing in the municipality’s recovery plan indicating
that municipal bylaws had been amended to modify rebuilding requirements to mitigate
future disaster risk.203 Indeed, the post-fire assessment identified the need for provincial and
local disaster resilience strategies that would ensure that recovery and rebuilding occurs in
a manner that reduces future disaster risk.204
Current disaster law focuses on providing adequate compensation for those who have
suffered disaster harm or loss, raising important questions about distributional justice in the
aftermath of a disaster. This body of disaster recovery law is essentially retrospective.
Forward-looking laws, such as the “ordinary” (that is, non-emergency) planning and
development laws, are crucial to ensuring that communities can build back better and reduce
their vulnerability to future disaster harm. In the instance of the Beast, however, there appear
to be no legal mechanisms that link disaster recovery with the high-level commitment of
provincial and federal governments to the principle of building back better.
D. THE LAW OF DISASTER PREVENTION AND MITIGATION
As just noted, a vulnerability perspective identifies the juncture between recovery and
prevention as a critical moment for building back better in order to reduce future
vulnerability. In order to be impactful, prevention must begin to target the underlying
systemic drivers of disaster vulnerability. As we have seen, the focus of the building back
better philosophy is often on the reconstruction of physical infrastructure to reduce risk to
future disasters. However, building back better can and ought to apply to our civic
infrastructure too: that is, addressing the limits and gaps in existing law and policy that have
contributed to disaster vulnerability. The challenge, then, is to begin to imagine legal
mechanisms that can channel recovery and prevention measures in a direction that begins to
address systemic drivers of vulnerability. As we will see, the Beast represents a missed
opportunity to connect recovery and prevention to systemic drivers, as prevention has been
defined in an unduly narrow fashion.
In its current form in Canada, it is possible to identify four components of the law of
disaster prevention: (1) continuous learning; (2) mainstreaming disaster risk reduction; (3)
public awareness; and (4) targeted mitigation infrastructure. As we will now see, however,
these components are largely in the form of policy objectives and there are few legislated or
regulatory provisions that operationalize these goals.
201 Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo, by-law No 16/011, To Amend the Law Use Bylaw by
Temporarily Restricting Development in Certain Areas of the Municipality (28 June 2016).
202 Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo, “Recovery Task Force - Rebuild Pillar Progress Update,”
online: <www.rmwb.ca/News-Room/RMWB-Wildfire-Information/Recovery-Progress-Updates/Re
build-Pillar-Progress.htm>.
203 RMWB, Recovery Plan, supra note 108. Bylaw No 16/020 amended the Land Use Bylaw for areas
affected by the wildfire in order to provide additional rebuilding options and to streamline the permitting
process: Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo, by-law No 16/020, To Amend Land Use Bylaw No
99/059, (28 September 2016).
204 KPMG LLP, supra note 22 at 53.
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The first aspect of disaster recovery law is a commitment to continual learning through
post-disaster assessment. Alberta’s hazard-specific wildfire plan includes a standard
requirement that each organization involved in the fire conduct a post-incident assessment
to identify the causes of the fire, effectiveness of response, and strategies to prevent or
mitigate future fires.205 
The Alberta government has developed a practice of arranging for comprehensive,
external assessments after major disasters. This practice was maintained in the instance of
the Beast following analogous assessments of the 2011 Lesser Slave Lake wildfire and the
2013 flooding in southern Alberta. The comprehensive post-fire assessment revealed several
strengths of the provincial response (for example, enhanced support for local communities,
and the upgraded Emergency Alert system),206 but also revealed that the provincial
government had failed to incorporate many of the recommendations made after the Lesser
Slake Lake fire, including establishing a provincial evacuation framework, enhancing
emergency communications, and formalizing procedures for the Provincial Operations
Centre.207 In light of the lack of transparency in emergency preparedness, these external
assessments serve an important role in public accountability by revealing to the public gaps
and flaws in otherwise opaque and technical disaster management practices.
One first step in strengthening Canadian disaster law is to formalize the Alberta
government’s practice of seeking an external post-disaster assessment. Making this a
requirement in the EMA (Alta) would entrench the government’s commitment to continual
learning as part of disaster prevention. While there is often significant political pressure in
the aftermath of an emergency response that can lead to the government commissioning an
assessment, a legal requirement will remove any uncertainty from this process. Indeed, a
vulnerability perspective reveals the importance of formalizing this requirement because it
highlights the disproportionate disaster harm suffered by marginalized groups. These are
often the same groups who are the least able to exert influence in the political process. They
therefore may not be able to generate the necessary public pressure to demand an external
assessment when others are relatively unaffected by the event. One need look no further than
the chronic and repeated states of emergency for reserves across Canada as evidence of this
problem.208
Moreover, in light of the important role that external assessment currently plays in public
accountability — by spotlighting otherwise opaque emergency management practices —
such a legal requirement should not be exclusive to major disasters. Indeed, it is possible to
imagine federal leadership in this respect by linking external assessment of provincial
practices to federal assistance. The EMA (Canada) could make commissioning an external
assessment a condition of a province’s receiving federal support under the Act. Such a
requirement would encourage best practices at the provincial and local levels with the goal
of reducing future vulnerability (and thus reliance on future federal disaster relief funding).
205 Ibid at 15.
206 Ibid at 5–6 (summary).
207 Ibid at 66, 79, 90.
208 See e.g. Allan Woods, “A First Nations Cry for Help Gets Little Government Attention: Star
Investigation,” Toronto Star (25 April 2016), online: <https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2016/04/
25/a-first-nations-cry-for-help-gets-little-government-attention-star-investigation.html>.
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The second and third features of mainstreaming disaster risk and public awareness are
expressed in Canada’s National Disaster Mitigation Strategy, an intergovernmental strategy
between the federal government and the provinces and territories.209 The Mitigation Strategy
sets out several high-level commitments, with special attention to “reducing risk posed by
natural hazards.”210 In the Mitigation Strategy, governments agree to promote the
mainstreaming of disaster risk reduction initiatives into existing public programs. They also
agree to promote disaster prevention and mitigation public awareness. They further agree to
promote scientific and engineering best practices and lessons learned for sustainable and
cost-effective mitigation.
Federal government action in these three areas of commitment has been relatively
minimal.211 In terms of mainstreaming prevention and mitigation, Public Safety Canada has
developed a Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, a program which brings together hundreds
of organizations through its annual roundtable, for the purpose of discussing national disaster
risk reduction issues and sharing information.212 In addition, Public Safety Canada maintains
a natural hazards database,213 but there is little additional visible action being taken to
promote public awareness of a range of disasters at the national level. As already noted, the
federal government incentivizes prevention and mitigation infrastructure through its DFAA.
Notably, the federal government also launched a specific program, the National Disaster
Mitigation Program, which targets flood risk and flooding and includes a number of
initiatives that address these three areas of disaster prevention and mitigation.214 
The EMA (Alta) empowers the Minister to “conduct public information programs relating
to emergency preparedness for and the mitigation of disasters.”215 With respect to wildfire
specifically, this is implemented through the Alberta FireSmart program.216 The program
contains seven disciplines, including public education, firefighter training, interagency co-
operation, and fuel management.217 The significance of fuel management is emphasized by
the hazard-specific Interface Fires plan, which sets out requirements for removing low-lying
shrubs and maintaining firebreaks around man-made structures.218
FireSmart principles are again emphasized as a specific mitigation activity in Wood
Buffalo’s Recovery Plan. The municipality anticipates conducting a wide-ranging review of
209 Government of Canada, Canada’s National Disaster Mitigation Strategy (Ottawa: Government of
Canada, 2011), online: <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/mtgtn-strtgy/mtgtn-strtgy-
eng.pdf> [Mitigation Strategy]. Pursuant to EMA (Canada), supra note 79, s 4(1)(f).
210 Mitigation Strategy, ibid at 1.
211 The Infrastructure Canada database (dating back to 2002) only includes one project categorized as
“disaster mitigation.” One program, the Joint Emergency Preparedness Program, identified as a
commitment in the strategy, appears to have been scrapped: Federation of Canadian Municipalities,
“Emergency Preparedness and Response” (28 August 2017), online: <https://fcm.ca/home/issues/
emergency-preparedness-and-response.htm>.
212 “Canada’s Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction” (Ottawa: PSC, 2017), online: <https://www.public
safety.gc.ca/cnt/mrgnc-mngmnt/dsstr-prvntn-mtgtn/pltfrm-dsstr-rsk-rdctn/index-en.aspx>. The Platform
and its Advisory Committee also facilitates members joining more specific working groups on disaster
risk reduction.
213 “Natural Hazards of Canada” (Ottawa: PSC, 2015), online: <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/mrgnc-
mngmnt/ntrl-hzrds/index-en.aspx>.
214 Public Safety Canada, “National Disaster Mitigation Program (NDMP)” (Ottawa: PSC, 2017), online:
<https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/mrgnc-mngmnt/dsstr-prvntn-mtgtn/ndmp/index-en.aspx>.
215 Supra note 93, s 9(g).
216 Government of Alberta, Home Again, supra note 17 at 40–41.
217 Ibid at 40.
218 Supra note 99 at 7–8.
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all its development bylaws to ensure they comply with FireSmart principles.219 In addition
to this example of mainstreaming disaster risk reduction, the Recovery Plan also includes
targeted mitigation projects that provide multiple evacuation routes out of the region in the
event of a future disaster.220
A second preliminary step for strengthening the law of disaster prevention and mitigation
is to require governments to engage in prevention practices that directly address systemic
drivers of disasters. Existing Canadian disaster law appears to implement disaster recovery
and prevention mechanisms in a remarkably narrow fashion that fails to connect recovery
with systemic risk factors in any robust way. 
For example, the centerpiece of prevention is better implementation of FireSmart policy
at the municipal and provincial levels.221 FireSmart is a program that encourages greater
public awareness of fire hazards, better training of firefighters, and promotes fuel
management (for example, the maintenance of firebreaks around buildings). While FireSmart
may adequately address some immediate contributors to future fire risk — the growing
interaction between humans and forested areas, for example — it does not address deeper,
more systemic drivers of disaster vulnerability, such as land-use planning and rapid
urbanization. 
One example of an underlying driver is the rapid population growth of the Fort McMurray
region due to oil sands development.222 The post-fire assessment rightly identifies the need
for alternate evacuation routes to accommodate the city’s large population.223 But, in addition
to this physical infrastructure, it is worth examining the deficiencies in existing planning law
that failed to identify this need in advance of a major disaster. Environmental law research
has long identified the need for more robust environmental impact assessment that accounts
for cumulative environmental impacts of development.224 Commentators have frequently
pointed to the Alberta oil sands as an example of a region in which the absence of cumulative
impacts assessment has allowed development in the region to grow unchecked by mounting
environmental concerns.225 
219 RMWB, Recovery Plan, supra note 108 at 46–47.
220 Ibid at 35.
221 Government of Alberta, Home Again, supra note 17 at 40; RMWB, Recovery Plan, ibid at 18, 35;
KPMG LLP, supra note 22 at 49–50; MNP LLP, A Review of the 2016 Horse River Wildfire: Alberta
Agriculture and Forestry Preparedness and Response (Edmonton: MNP LLP, 2017) at 48–49, online:
<https://www.alberta.ca/assets/documents/Wildfire-MNP-Report.pdf>. 
222 Cutter, Boruff & Shirley, supra note 51 at 248; Lisa Grow Sun, “Smart Growth in Dumb Places:
Sustainability, Disaster, and the Future of the American City” [2011] 6 BYUL Rev 2157 at 2157.
223 KPMG LLP, supra note 22 at 66.
224 Martin ZP Olszynski, “Ancient Maxim, Modern Problems: De Minimis, Cumulative Environmental
Effects and Risk-Based Regulation” (2015) 40:2 Queen’s LJ 705 at 727; Thomas R Berger, Northern
Frontier, Northern Homeland: The Report of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry, vol 1 (Ottawa:
Supply and Services Canada, 1977) (remains the gold standard for robust and inclusive assessment).
225 Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development, 2011 October Report of the
Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development: Chapter 2—Assessing Cumulative
Environmental Effects of Oil Sands Projects (Ottawa: Auditor General of Canada, 2011), online: <www.
oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_cesd_201110_02_e_35761.html>; Heather McLeod-Kilmurray &
Gavin Smith, “Unsustainable Development in Canada: Environmental Assessment, Cost-Benefit
Analysis, and Environmental Justice in the Tar Sands” (2010) 21 J Envtl L & Prac 65. See also Shaun
Fluker, “The Jurisdiction of Alberta’s Energy and Utilities Board to Consider Broad Socio-Ecological
Concerns Associated with Energy Projects” (2005) 42:4 Alta L Rev 1085 (on gaps in assessing the
socio-economic impacts of rapid development).
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In the context of disaster prevention, one can imagine a logical extension of known, if not
implemented, cumulative environmental assessment processes to account for disaster risk.
Environmental assessment law might require that region-based or project-based assessments
account for the increased disaster risk created by growing a region’s population. This allows
proper mitigation measures (such as additional evacuation routes) to be identified and
implemented as the community grows and, hopefully, before a disaster occurs. 
Relatedly, the independent post-fire report recommended that the provincial government
develop and utilize a planning tool to address the multi-faceted nature of major disasters. It
identified the need for an annual cumulative risk assessment to enable the province to plan
for large-scale disasters.226 It noted the province’s current inadequate focus on hazard-
specific planning that “may contribute to a lack of understanding of the collective risk that
a wildfire or other disaster may bring about.”227 A cumulative risk assessment would enable
the province and local governments to better determine whether they have adequate capacity
to respond.
Of course it is a fallacy to think that disaster law can prevent or mitigate all disasters. The
challenge for disaster law is rather to devise institutions and procedures that help us expect
the unexpected while simultaneously addressing the root causes of vulnerability. The
institutional responses to the Fort McMurray wildfire reveal that, at present, there are glaring
ways in which Canadian disaster law fails to do either.
Recovery efforts in the aftermath of the Beast have been comprehensive and will continue
for years as the community rebuilds after this major event. These recovery efforts include
initiatives at the federal, provincial, and local level that seek to promote continual learning,
mainstream disaster risk reduction, enhance public awareness, and promote targeted
mitigation projects. However, most of these initiatives are ad hoc programs and projects that
are not mandated by the formal structure of current Canadian disaster law. 
* * *
This part has mapped the terrain of Canadian disaster law. It has identified key
characteristics of Canadian disaster law at each of the four stages of the disaster cycle. In
doing so, it has also identified striking ways in which disaster law departs from the core
insights of a vulnerability perspective. In particular, this part noted the absence of a focus on
people and communities in the law of emergency preparedness, which instead focused more
on technical concerns about hazards, assets, and services. In addition, it noted the failure of
disaster law to formalize connections between disaster recovery and prevention in order to
address systemic drivers of disaster risk and reduce future vulnerability. 
226 KPMG LLP, supra note 22 at 60–61.
227 Ibid at 62. Particularly striking, in light of the heavy industrialization of the municipal region, is the
current gap in emergency planning with respect to identifying industry infrastructure such as pipelines
and communications towers (ibid).
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IV.  CONCLUSION
This article has mapped the landscape of Canadian disaster law. It has argued that the need
to analyze disaster law arises clearly from the central role that law plays in both creating and
ameliorating conditions of disaster vulnerability. Disaster research no longer conceptualizes
disasters as natural events. Rather, they are sociological phenomena in which law operates
long before and long after the extreme event and its immediate aftermath to shape
environmental and social conditions that lead to disaster harm. Moreover, it has argued that
vulnerability is an analytically useful perspective because it captures the universal,
individual, and relational dimensions of disasters. It thus demands that disaster law take a
context-sensitive approach by attending to individuals and communities who are especially
vulnerable to disasters.
The article has identified the shared, structural characteristics of the federal, provincial,
and local emergency laws that were implicated in the Fort McMurray wildfire. It has noted
gaps and challenges with current law at all four stages of the disaster cycle. First, the law of
disaster preparedness includes standard features of emergency management legislation, a
specialized public institution, a central emergency plan, and an operations centre. However,
the emergency plan and secondary plans, crucial elements of emergency preparedness, are
not transparent. This means that the public is not able to scrutinize the adequacy of disaster
preparedness. Moreover, the publicly available sources suggest that the law of disaster
preparedness does not identify or attend to vulnerable communities in any concrete way.
Rather than focusing on the necessarily place-based and context-specific factors that create
or contribute to a community’s vulnerability, the law of disaster preparedness relies on a
uniform and one-dimensional concept of vulnerability.
Second, the law of disaster response is characterized by the legislated delegation of power
to declare states of emergency and a predetermined set of emergency response powers. In
contrast to the other three stages of the disaster cycle, this aspect of disaster law is relatively
clear and coherent. Yet the response to the Beast suggests that coordination between levels
of government during large-scale disaster response remains a challenge.
Third, the law of disaster recovery contains compensatory and planning and development
dimensions. The article has noted that while compensation for disaster harm is an area that
has received some attention in the legal literature, climate-related disasters pose fundamental
challenges for the policy and institutional design of insurance, liability, and public disaster
relief funds. The article has drawn attention to the significance of “non-emergency” planning
and development laws in disaster recovery. It noted that in the context of the Beast, these
laws are not clearly and explicitly connected to disaster recovery law, which undermines
their potential for reducing future vulnerability by building back better. 
Finally, within the law of disaster prevention, it is possible to observe the four components
of continual learning, mainstreaming disaster risk reduction, public awareness, and targeted
mitigation projects. A vulnerability perspective emphasizes the crucial connection between
recovery and prevention for confronting systemic drivers of disaster vulnerability. This
article has highlighted the extent to which these prevention mechanisms are underdeveloped
in Canadian law. It has also observed that the mechanisms that do exist are implemented in
a narrow manner that fails to address underlying drivers of disaster vulnerability. In sum, the
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terrain of Canadian disaster law does not reflect the multi-dimensional understanding of
vulnerability found in disaster literature, and thus leaves communities unnecessarily
susceptible to disaster harm.
The independent assessment of the Fort McMurray wildfire attributed the success of the
response “to the young demographics of the community, and how the community rallied
together to help one another evacuate safely.”228 From this conclusion, it is easy to surmise
that the outcome was a product of “blind luck.”229 This impression resonates with the major
gaps this article has uncovered in Canadian disaster law. It evidences the urgent need to
seriously integrate disaster research into existing laws and policies to ensure that Canadians
are not unnecessarily vulnerable to disaster harm. In the absence of these changes,
communities that are less able-bodied, less affluent, and less cohesive face the prospect of
disaster harm.
The observation about luck is dangerous, however, because it risks underestimating the
tangible ways in which communities can, through their laws and institutional practices,
protect themselves from disaster harm. A vulnerability perspective suggests that what may
appear to be luck is often the product of less visible institutional practices — for example,
sound building codes, stable local economies, and universal health care. In this respect, Fort
McMurray reflects a paradigmatic disaster double bind. The oil sands’ heartland is a
contributor to the community’s young, able-bodied, and affluent demographics that allowed
the community to avoid a worst-case scenario. But it is also the reason why so large a
community is in the middle of harm’s way. 
A research agenda on Canadian disaster law must unpack the roles that law plays in
creating disaster double binds, like that experienced in Fort McMurray. As this article has
argued, law inevitably governs disasters. The challenge is ensuring that it operates to reduce
disaster vulnerability. Without attending to both the immediate and systemic ways in which
law contributes to conditions of vulnerability, disaster law can only ever play a partial, and
inadequate, role in disaster management.
228 Ibid at 69.
229 Jason Markusoff, “Why Fort McMurray Residents were the Real Heroes of the Fire Crisis,” Macleans
(9 June 2017), online: <www.macleans.ca/news/why-fort-mcmurray-residents-not-authorities-were-the-
real-heroes-of-the-fire-crisis/>.
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